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Major cyber attacks against the cyber networks of organizations has become a common
phenomenon nowadays. Cyber attacks are carried out both through the spread of malware
and also through multi-stage attacks known as hacking. A cyber network can be represented directly as a simple directed or undirected network (graph) of nodes and arcs. It can
also be represented by a transformed network such as the attack graph which uses information about network topology, attacker profile, and existing vulnerabilities to represent
all the potential attack paths from readily accesible vulnerabilities to valuable target nodes.
Then, interdicting or hardening a subset of arcs in the network naturally maps into deploying security countermeasures on the associated devices or connections. In this dissertation,
we develop network interdiction models and algorithms to optimally select a subset of
arcs which upon interdiction minimizes the spread of infection or minimizes the loss from
multi-stage attacks. In particular, we define four novel network connectivity-based metrics
and develop interdiction models to optimize the metrics. Direct network representation of

the physical cyber network is used as the underlying network in this case. Two of the interdiction models prove to be very effective arc removal methods for minimizing the spread
of infection. We also develop multi-level network interdiction models that remove a subset
of arcs to minimize the loss from multi-stage attacks. Our models capture the defenderattacker interaction in terms of stackelberg zero-sum games considering the attacker both
as a complete rational and bounded rational agents. Our novel solution algorithms based
on constraint and column generation and enhanced by heuristic methods efficiently solve
the difficult multi-level mixed-integer programs with integer variables in all levels in reasonable times.

Key words: Network interdiction, cyber security, attack graph, constraint and column generation, bi-level program, mixed integer linear programming
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Organizations nowadays rely heavily on a network of computers, smart devices, and
smart equipments to streamline flow of information for proper functioning and increased
productivity. This network of computers are sometimes organized as a local area network
(LAN) as shown in Figure 1.1, if the computers are located in close proximity.

Figure 1.1
Local Area Network (LAN)

Sometimes, especially for large organizations, when the computers are not in close
proximity, the network is organized as a wide area network (WAN) as shown in Figure 1.2

1

through different means such as the internet. The network of an organization is also connected to the internet to exchange information with customers and other stakeholders. Unfortunately, this connected nature of organizations are also making them prone to frequent
and major cyber attacks to steal information, disrupt business operations, disclose confidential information, and cause harms in other ways [77].

Figure 1.2
Wide Area Network (WAN)

FBI received a total of 269,422 complaints in 2014 with an adjusted dollar loss of
$800,492,073 [50]. The adjusted dollar loss is in reality billions of dollars considering that
only a small proportion of all victims file directly to IC3. The sheer number of complaints
and the dollar losses give some idea about the magnitude of the problem. However, the IC3
report is mainly based on individual victims, and this dissertation is concerned with cyber
attacks and losses to organizations. According to the State of Cybersecurity report by [65],
2

the average cost of cybercrime for US retail stores was $8.6 million per company in 2014
which was more than double of the average cost in 2013. The PricewaterhouseCoopers
reported in its “Global State of Information security report 2015” that the total number of
security incidents detected by respondents grew to 42.8 million around the world, up 48%
from 2013.
[52] reported that, among the the high profile cyber attacks against big businesses in
2014, hackers got access to confidential information of up to 11 million customers of
Primera Blue Cross - a Washington-based health insurer. Hackers breached a database
of 80 million former and current customers of Anthem. In an attack against Home Depot,
hackers compromised 56 million payment cards. The estimated cost to Home Depot from
the breach was $62 million. In an attack against JPMorgan Chase, account information
about 83 million households and small businessses were compromised. Refer to [52, 62]
for several other high profile cyber attacks against big businesses in 2014. Therefore, it
is quite expected to see large increase in cyber security budgets of corporations and governments [65]. In a survey by [65], 56.09% of cybersecurity professionals reported an expected increase in cybersecurity budget in 2015 compared to the budget in 2014. President
Barack Obama in his 2015 budget proposed a sharp increase in spending on cybersecurity,
to $14 billion.
Organizations suffer different types of cyber attacks such as hacking attempts, Malware, social engineering, phishing, watering hole, and so on. In the survery by [65],
50.14% and 66.48% of the respondents, respectively reported that their organizations suffered hacking attempts and malware attacks. Infact, hacking and malware attacks are the
3

second and third most frequent attack types after phishing attacks. Although attacks are
divided into the above mentioned categories for simplicity of analysis and discussion, more
often than not, one attack type is used as part of another attack type. For example, phishing
attack is frequently used as part of a malware attack; malware attack is used as one of the
attack vectors in a hacking attack. While the attacks reported in [52, 62] are mainly hacking attacks, there is no lack of malware attacks in recent times. In one of the high profile
malware attacks, 1000 to 1500 centrifuges were destroyed in the Natanz nuclear facility of
Iran by spreading a computer worm called Stuxnet [134]. [146] provided a brief discussion
on 8 deadly computer viruses that appeared at different times over the years.
Malware in malware attacks almost always come with a spreading mechanism, i.e.,
after one or more computers in a network is infected with a malware, the malware can
replicate itself and infect many other computers through activities among infected and uninfected (susceptible) computers. This phenomenon of infection spreading is very similar
to infectious disease epidemiology [32, 102]. [72] provided the first serious attempt to
adapt mathematical epidemiology to model the spread of computer viruses. [73] in a subsequent article discussed the analogies between the spread of computer viruses (malware)
and biological diseases. [171] provided a mathematical model for the propagation of the internet worm called Code Red. [112] and [172] investigated the spread of computer viruses
through the email network resulted from the email address books of the victims. Using
a combination of analytic modeling and simulation, [97] described the design space of a
worm containment system in terms of parameters such as reaction time, containment strategy, and deployment scenario. [75] studied the propagation of computer worms through
4

the internet using the SIS and modified SIR epidemiological models. [168] proposed a
proactive worm propagation model in unstructured P2P networks.
In this dissertation, we study both the problem of spread of malware infection and
multi-stage attacks (hacking) against the cyber network of an organization. In particular,
we explore methods to minimize the spread of infection and develop models and algorithms to minimize the potential damage from multi-stage attacks. The cyber network of
an organization can be represented as a simple graph with the computers as the nodes and
the connections among the computers as the arcs (Figure 1.3).
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Figure 1.3
Undirected graph

The resulting graph can be either undirected (Figure 1.3) or directed (Figure 1.4). In
our study the spread of infections, we represent the underlying cyber network as an undirected graph with a set of initially infected and susceptible nodes. Red and white nodes in
Figure 1.5 represent the initially infected and susceptible nodes, respectively. In contrast,
5

in our study of the multi-stage attacks, we use a special type of directed graph called the
attack graph which is generated from the underlying cyber network (Figure 1.6).
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Figure 1.4
Directed graph

[119] first proposed the attack graph as a tool to analyze multi-stage attacks. A node
in an attack graph represents an attack state or a security condition, and an arc repsents
an atomic attack or exploit/vulnerability. An attack graph represents all the paths from the
initial security conditions (initially vulnerable nodes) to some desired states (goal nodes).
Thus, an attack graph represents all the paths that can be potentially used by an attacker to
compromise a goal node. In Figure 1.6, the salmon nodes with dashed borders represent
the initially vulnerable nodes, the blue nodes represent the transition nodes, and the green
nodes represent the goal nodes.
The following inputs are used to generate an attack graph: a database of common
attacks broken down into atomic steps, information on network topology and configuration,
6
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Figure 1.5
Spread of infection on a graph
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Figure 1.6
Directed attack graph

7

ϰͲϱ

and an attacker profile. [144] proposed an automated attack graph generation tool using
these inputs. Since then, researchers have proposed and studied a multitude of attack graph
variations such as attack trees [155] and defense trees [22]. Refer to [86] and [79] for a
comprehensive review of different types of attack graphs. In this dissertation, we used
randomly generated synthetic attack graphs as the underlying graph in our models and
algorithms for multi-stage attacks. However, we envisage using the attack graph generated
by a tool similar to the one developed by [144] in future.
Interdiction in general means thwarting something from happening. Network interdiction is the act of reducing the capacities of some of the components (nodes and arcs) of
a network or removing the components altogether from the network to minimize the activities of some agents. Thus, network interdiction is the most appropriate in modeling a
problem when the activities in question and the system in which the agents are operating
can be represented using a network. The spread of infection of a malware can be represented as the stochastic propagation of infection from the nodes infected by the malware to
the susceptible nodes through the arcs of the network. A multi-stage attack can be represented as the step by step movement of an attacker in an attack graph toward the goal nodes
in an effort to reach them starting from the initially vulnerable nodes. Network interdiction
in the context of this dissertation means the complete removal of a subset of arcs from the
network.
The contributions of this dissertation are as follows. In regard to minimizing spread of
infections, we define effective connectivity related metrics, develop novel mixed-integer
programming models to optimize the metrics, and propose efficient heuristic methods to
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solve them quickly (Chapter 2). In regard to minimizing the damage from multi-stage
cyber attacks, first, we develop a bi-level network interdiction model to represent the zerosum stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender and propose effiicient exact and
heuristic solution algorithms (Chapter 3). Second, we develop tri-level network interdiction model to study the game between an attacker and a defender when the attacker is
boundedly rational (chapter 4). In all of our studies, the objective is to select an optimum
subset of arcs to remove them from the graph in an effort to optimize different goals.
In chapter 2, we propose effective methods to remvove a subset of arcs from a network
to minimize the spread of infection. We define four metrics on network connectivity, develop network interdiction models to minimize the metrics through arc removal, and then
use the models as the arc removal methods for minimizing spread of infection. We compare
the effectiveness of these four models with the effectiveness of two existing arc removal
methods [47, 76] and random arc removal in terms of both the amount of new infections
and the speed of the spread. Comparisons show that two of our methods are very effective
in minimizing the amount of spread and minimizing the speed of spread, respectively. We
provide valuable insights that can be used to formulate effective isolation and quarantine
policies.
As it takes relatively long time to solve large instances of the interdiction models developed in chapter 2, we developed heuristic algorithms based on Monte Carlo simulation.
Monte carlo method entails the estimation of the qualities of all the solutions (population)
via evaluation of a sample from the population using random numbers. [55] presented
one of the first applications of the Monte Carlo method. [37] presented a heuristic algo9

rithm based on the Monte Carlo method. [124] developed a Monte Carlo based algorithm
for iteratively computing projective clusters. [93] proposed a Monte Carlo based global
optimization method named simulated tempering. Refer to [54] for a comprehensive discussion on the current state of Monte Carlo based methods.
In chapter 3, we present a bi-level attacker-defender network interdiction model capturing the stackelberg zero sum game between an attacker and a defender played on an
attack graph. In particular, the bi-level model selects a subset of arcs which upon removal
minimizes the maximum damage that can be caused by the attacker. We proposed a novel
exact algorithm, enhancements, and heuristic methods to speed up the solution. The exact
algorithm is a novel application of the constraint and column generation method.
Application of game theory for cyber security is not new. Game theoretic approaches
are appropriate because, most of the times, the behavior of the attackers of a cyber network
are driven by the defensive measures undertaken by the defender suggesting an interaction
betweeen these two parties. [8] investigated the possible application of game theoretic concepts to develop a decision and control framework. In particular, they model and analyze
a game between an attacker and a network of intrusion detection system sensors within a
two-person, non-zero sum game. [2] defined a cooperative game among the sensor nodes
in a mobile wireless sensor networks. They cluster the nodes based on some similarity of
a payoff function and defines one strategy set for each node that guarantees an equilibrium
point. [29] investigated the value of game theoretic modeling in information security. They
found that a firm enjoys a higher payoff if the security decisions are derived from game
theoretic models versus decision theoretic models. [28] developed a game theoretic model
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to find the optimal patch updating frequency to balance the operational cost associated
with patch updating and the damage associated with unpatched security vulnerabilities.
[87] presented the interaction between an attackeer and the administrator of a network as
a two-player stochastic game and formulate the game as a non-linear programming model
to find the Nash equilibrium. [67] provided a good discussion on the problem of applying game theory in security and current successes in solving real-world security problems.
[83] examined a security game in which the defender is monitoring the vertices of a graph.
They found that the applicability of the approach directly is highly dependent on factors
such as type of graph, type of schedules, and the type of defender resources. Calculating
the marginal probability of individual resource deployment, [131] proposed a stochastic
game theoretic modeling approach that can be used to predict the security and dependability behavior of a system. Refer to [130, 89, 84] for a comprehensive review of game theory
as applied to security of computer and communication networks.
Our studies in chapter 3 and 4 complements and extends the existing literature on attack graph cut-set generation [3, 7, 40, 68, 114]. However, cut-set generation literature
does not apply game-theoretic approaches in most of the cases. Among the game theoretic approaches on attack graphs, [40] proposed a multi-objective optimization model
posing the attacker-defender interation as an arms race. They use genetic algorithm and
competitive co-evolution to solve the model. [169] proposed an automated response approach called the response and recovery engine posing the attacker-defender interation as
a two-player stackelberg stochastic game. [45] presented a game-theoretic model capturing the game between a network administrator and an attacker played on an attack graph.
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They use Markov Decision Process and associated policy search technique to solve the
model. [138] proposed a game-theoretic model based on Vulnerability Dependency Graph
- a variation of attack graph. In this game, the attacker tries to maximize his impact, and
the defender tries to both minimize the worst-case impact by patching vulnerabilites or
removing some software and maximize the productivity within the enterprise by retaining
important software.
A special type of game called the stackelberg game follows a sequential game structure
in which the defender is the leader making a defensive decision first, and the attacker is
the follower making her decision based on the defender’s decision. The sequential nature
of the stackelberg game makes it very effective in modeling network security games. [80]
presented a game-theoretic modeling approach for security in a stackelberg game setting.
[80] accounted for the uncertainty in the attacker’s surveillance capability. They provide
valuable insights from different game settings such as multiple versus single target for the
attacker and interchangeability of the Nash equilibria. [120] presented a Bayesian Stackelberg game based approach for randomized defensive actions. Their implemented softwared
agent is able to appropriately weight different actions and account for uncertainty in adversary type. [122] discussed the design choices and challenges in the implementation of
a software system called the GAURDS. Compared to the previously studied approaches,
[122] included the following features: reasoning about many heterogeneous security activities, reasoning about diverse potential threats, a system designed for hundreds of end
users. [117] proposed an efficient exact algorithm for Bayesian Stackelberg games. The algorithm is based on a novel mixed-integer linear programming formulation. One important
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assumption in Stackelberg games is that the followers are completely rational. Realizing
that leader sometimes faces human followers, [121] proposed an approach to find robust
solutions to stackelberg games in which the followers are boundedly rational. [74] presented new scalable models and algorithms for Stackelberg security games.
Because of the multi-stage or decentralized nature of decision making in Stackelberg
games and also in network interdiction problems, these classes of problems can be naturally
formulated as multi-level mixed-integer linear programs. A problem should be formulated
as a bi-level or a tri-level programming model depending on whether the decisions in the
problem are made sequentially in two stages or three stages, respectively. [98] showed one
of the earlier applications of bi-level programming. Among some other existing studies,
[143] presented a bi-level programming model with the upper level determining the optimal location of logistics centers and the lower level determining the equilibrium customer
demand distribution. [126] proposed a bi-level quadratic programming model to derive robust knock strategies in the optimization procedure identifying gene knockouts for targeted
bichemical overproduction. Refer to [15] for a tutorial on different properties of bi-level
programming. [51] extended bi-level linear programming showing its capacity to reformulate mixed-integer linear programs. The author defined a natural generalizaiton of the
bi-level linear programming problem and show that most of the existing algorithms originally developed for bi-level linear programs can be adapted to this new class of bi-level
programs.
Although there is an abundance of studies on bi-level programming, only a few of those
studies include integer variable in the lower level [136, 159, 132, 164, 39, 158]. Solution
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of this class of bi-level problem poses additional challenges due to the integer variable in
the lower level. [136] presented a bi-level mixed-integer programming formulation of the
r-interdiction median problem with fortification. They solve the problem through an implicit enumeration. [159] proposed a new exact algorithm based on Branch and Bound.
Compared to the existing algorithms, their algorithm relies on a fewer and weaker assumptions, explicitely considers finite optimal, infeasible, and unbounded cases, and terminates
correctly in finite number of iterations. [38] presented a bi-level mixed-integer programming model for vulnerability analysis of electric grid and developed an algorithm based
on Multi-start Benders decomposition. [164] provided a generic algorithmic framework
based on column-and-constraint generation for bi-level programming problems including
those with integer lower levels. Refer to the dissertations by [39] and [158] for a comprehensive discussion on different properties and solution challenges associated with bi-level
programming problems.
In chapter 4, we relax the assumption in typical game theoretic models that the attacker is completely rational. Specifically, we consider that the rationality of an attacker
is bounded, and it causes the attacker to be able to inflict only a fraction of the maximum
damage that can be inflicted with complete rationality. We formulate the problem as a
tri-level mixed-integer linear programming network interdiction model. We also develop
customized column and constraint generation algorithm to solve the model. Our results
demonstrate that incorporating bounded rationality of the attacker could be important depending on the characteristic of the underlying problem.
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[11] provided one of the earlier applications of the tri-level linear program. [6] presented a defender-attacker-defender problem to address the problem of minizing vulnerability of electric power grid against multiple contingencies. Their solution algorithm first
reformulates the tri-level program into a bi-level program, and then applies implicit enumeration to solve the resulting bi-level program. [160] proposed a tri-level programming
model based on conditional value at risk for a three-stage supply chain management problem. Their solution method also involved reformulation of the tri-level program into an
equivalent bi-level program. [64] proposed a tri-level programming model for disaster preparedness planning and solved the model using an iterative dual-ascent solution approach.
[167] presented an algorithm called the kth-best algorithm for the general tri-level linear
programming model.
We envision the work of this dissertation as a big step toward developing a comprehensive modeling and algorithmic framework that will be used inside a cyber security
decision support software system. In addition to the security models and algorithms, the
proposed software system will also include other supporting modules such as the module
for automated attack graph generation. Guided by organizational policies and protocols
and personal judgment, cyber security personnel would use the proposed software to decide about which components of the cyber network to harden under different scenarios
including defending against state sponsored hackers, hackers seeking financial gains, etc.
or a combination thereof.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS FOR REMOVING LINKS IN A NETWORK TO MINIMIZE THE
SPREAD OF INFECTIONS

2.1

Introduction
The spread of harmful infections are common in real life networks: infectious diseases

spread through social and transportation networks, computer viruses and malware spread
in computer networks, and propaganda and rumors spread in online social networks. Minimizing the spread of these infections is very important because they can cause significant
economic and social damage. Worldwide, infectious diseases cause over 10 million deaths
each year, accounting for 23% of the total disease related deaths [156]. In the well-known
influenza pandemic of 1918, 30 to 50 million people are estimated to have died [60]. According to [134], 1000 to 1500 centrifuges of an Iranian nuclear power plant were destroyed
by spreading a computer worm called Stuxnet. Lethal worms and viruses such as Stuxnet
can easily fall in the hands of terrorist organizations and rogue nations.
The simplest and traditional way of modeling spread of infections assumes the population as a homogeneous mix of individuals and then compartmentalizes them based on their
infection status. Although this simple compartmental framework has been extended to include some upper level host heterogeneities such as contact patterns among age groups,
differing spatial structure, inclusion of individual contact structure is a fairly recent phe16

nomenon [13]. The maturation of network science is enabling researchers to find limitations in the homogeneous mixing assumption and discover the value of network modeling
[96, 111, 118, 153]. It is indeed important to capture the underlying network because
the ability of networks to maintain connectivity when subjected to selective or random
removal of nodes or links depends on the particular network topology [4, 61]. Connectivity is a popular measure for networks, and it represents the ability of a network’s nodes
to communicate with one another, thereby, facilitating the spread of infections. Connectivity is applicable to infection control because removing the nodes and links in reducing
the connectivity of a network is analogous to immunization of individuals and preventing
contacts in reducing the spread of infections. In one of the earlier studies that applied
network modeling, [135] showed that the tolerance of scale-free networks [14] against
random node or link removal does not allow a homogeneous approximation of connectivity in infectious disease spread modeling and results in overestimation of the epidemic
threshold. [118] even found the absence of an epidemic threshold in scale-free networks.
Epidemic threshold as defined by [118] is the minimum value of the effective reproduction
Infection rate ) for which the infection spreads and turns into an epidemic; otherwise,
rate ( Recovery
rate
infection dies out. The implication of the work by [135] is that even in networks with
very small average connectivity, epidemics can occur, and to find the most influential set
of individuals to immunize or quarantine, one must consider the underlying network topology, irrespective of whether the topology resembles a scale-free, random [48], small-world
[153], or some other type of network. Immunizing or quarantining randomly based on
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homogeneous mixing assumption does not ensure effective reduction of the connectivity
of the network, thereby, not preventing the spread of infections effectively.
It is possible to reduce the connectivity of a network and consequently minimize or
slow down the spread of infections in the network by interdicting the network in two ways:
removing links and removing nodes. [147] and [76] proposed heuristic algorithms to minimize spread in a network by removing a subset of links. [47] proposed a network interdiction model with a non-linear programming formulation that minimizes the number of
nodes at risk of infection. [58] proposed a model that removes a set of both links and nodes
to minimize the total cost composed of the cost of infection and and the cost of preventing
infection. Their model can also be used as a node and link removal method to minimize
spread by accounting for the cost of prevention in a budget constraint. [78] analyzed the
behavior of basic reproduction number as defined originally by [111] with respect to link
removal and proposed a new definition for basic reproduction number. [161] proposed a
method to control a special type of spread known as the traffic-driven outbreak by removing links using different link ranking metrics. [31] studied the efficacy of several centrality
based link removal strategies on the spread of infectious diseases through the global airline
network. [81] proposed approximate algorithms for link removal to minimize complex
(threshold-based) contagion.
In a field related to controlling the spread of infections, other authors have studied the
problem of removing nodes in a network in order to maximize the fragmentation of the network, minimizing connectivity [1, 12, 33, 42, 139, 148, 150, 149]. This problem is known
as the critical node detection problem (CNDP). These studies on the CNDP optimize one
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or more of the following network fragmentation metrics: 1) the number of connected node
pairs (minimize), 2) the largest connected component size (minimize), and 3) the number
of connected components (maximize). Although the interdiction models related to CNDP
can be used to identify a set of nodes to remove to reduce the spread of infections, they are
not expected to reduce spread effectively as they assume all the nodes to be of the same
type rather than dividing the nodes into infectious and susceptible categories. The aforementioned fragmentation metrics also need to be significantly modified before they can be
used for interdicting a network to minimize spread; For example, to minimize spread, it
is enough to have just two connected components, one with all the infectious nodes and
the other with all the susceptible nodes, instead of maximizing the number of connected
components.
The field of network vulnerability and robustness analysis [20, 27, 44, 95, 103, 137,
141, 59, 43] is a closely related field of the critical node detection problem. The problem
analyzed in this field is functionally opposite of the critical node detection problem because
in this case, critical components (nodes and links) are those, whose hardening results in
maximizing the connectivity of the network. The fragmentation metrics that are minimized
in the CNDP are maximized in the robustness problem and vice versa. Moreover, although
some of the studies in this field consider cascading failure of components, most of the
studies do not consider spreading agents such as infections.
In this paper, we study the problem of detecting a subset of critical links in a network,
whose removal minimizes the spread of infections. Therefore, the problem studied in this
paper is similar to the critical nodel detection problem, but it is customized for minimizing
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spread by removing links instead of nodes. One of the reasons the link removal problem
is very important is that link removal allows finer control than node removal. If a node is
removed, all of the links connected to the node are automatically removed. In contrast, if
a link is removed, only that link is removed. A node can still be removed in this paradigm
by removing all of the links connected to it. Therefore, the link removal problem has the
potential to provide additional insights into problems that have only been studied under
node removal [24, 153, 23, 145, 82, 127]. [90, 91] compared several generic edge and
node ranking metrics in reducing the global spread of influenza through an airline network. According to their results, link ranking metrics are usually more effective than node
ranking metrics. Moreover, in many situations the node removal option is unattractive or
not available at all, whereas there is still a way to remove links. For example, it might
be very difficult to find and eliminate terrorists in a terrorist network, but there might be
a way to block their communication channels, in effect removing links among them. The
loss associated with completely shutting down an entire airport might be enormous, but it
might be possible to temporarily suspend the flights between two specific airports during a
global disease pandemic.However, we should also note that there are cases where node removal is feasible but link removal is not. For example, if the nodes in the network represent
individuals and the links represent the interactions between individuals, it may be possible
to target specific individuals for vaccination, but preventing specific individual-individual
interactions is likely not a feasible strategy.
Although many previous research studied the evolution of an spread of infection with
respect to link removal, only a small portion of them studied link removal methods that
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minimize the spread of infections. The algorithm proposed by [147] is based on the finding
that the leading eigenvalue of the network adjacency matrix determines whether a spread
will turn into an epidemic [151, 123]. They report the effectiveness of their algorithm by
showing that it reduces the leading eigenvalue more than other eigenvalues. They also report the effectiveness based on the comparison of the fraction of infected nodes produced
by a simulation. However, they do not use information about which nodes are infected
and which are not in the link selection mechanism. Also, they do not compare their effectiveness with any existing well-known link removal methods. The algorithm proposed
by [76] is based on bond percolation. The main virtue of the algorithm proposed by [147]
and the algorithm along with the speeding mechanism proposed by [76] is that that they
are fast. [76] evaluates the effectiveness of their algorithm in terms of an indirect measure called contamination degree. The model proposed by [47] minimizes connectivity
between infectious and susceptible nodes, and later in a subsequent work, [46] compare
the effectiveness of the model along with some other link removal approaches. Although
[47] present a heuristic procedure, it is unclear if their non-linear programming formulation can be solved to optimality for problem instances much larger than the instances
with 15 nodes that they solve using complete enumeration. They do not propose any exact
procedure other than complete enumeration. One common aspect of all of the studies including the studies that control the spread of infections by removing links is that they use
one or more indirect metrics such as the leading eigenvlaue [147], contamination degree
[76], susceptible nodes at risk of infection [47], etc. These metrics are assumed to be representing infection spread, and in most of the cases, they are not evaluated against a direct
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metric such as the average new infections. Although the interdiction models developed in
this work do not optimize any direct infection spread metric, they are evaluated in terms of
two direct infection spread metrics.
In this paper, we propose four network interdiction models and formulate them as
mixed-integer linear programs. We call the models as link removal methods, in that solution of each model provides a set of links whose removal optimize an interdiction metric.
Then, we evaluate the link removal methods by estimating two direct metrics of infection spread through two different types of simulations. The first model (M IN C ONNECT,
sub-section 2.3.4) minimizes the number of connections between infected and susceptible nodes. The second model (M INAT R ISK, sub-section 2.3.5) minimizes the number of
susceptible nodes having one or more connections with infected nodes. The third model
(M IN PATHS, sub-section 2.3.6) minimizes the number of paths between infected and susceptible nodes. The fourth model (M IN WPATHS, sub-section 2.3.7) minimizes the total
weight of the paths between infected and susceptible nodes. Weight of a path is calculated
as the product of the transmission probabilities of the links on that path. Since, there are
only a few existing link removal methods that minimize spread, we compare our link removal methods with random link removal, a link removal method proposed by [76], and
a method based on adapted betweenness centrality defined by [47]. After applying a link
removal method to select a set of links to remove, we remove the links from the network
and test the residual network using two types of simulations: susceptible-infectious (SI)
and susceptible-infectious-recovered (SIR). We estimate the average number of new infections (measures the occurrence of new infections) from the SIR simulation and the time to
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infect half of the susceptible nodes (measures the slowing down of the spread) from the SI
simulation.
Our methods have several advantages over the existing methods. First, unlike the methods in [76, 147], that directly propose algorithms, we propose both mathematical programming models and heuristic algorithms as faster solution alternatives. One advantage of a
mathematical programming model is that it allows one to take advantage of the rich algorithms and solvers developed for mathematical programs, in our case, integer programs.
Having a mathematical model in our view also enables future researchers to develop efficient exact algorithm based on the model itself such as cutting plane algorithms along with
novel valid inequalities or to use the model as the benchmark to develop more efficient and
effective approximate algorithms to solve the underlying problem.
Second, as we argue in section 2.3.4 that the M IN C ONNECT model is a general case of
the critical link detection problem, the M IN C ONNECT model and the M INAT R ISK model
which is an extension of the M IN C ONNECT model can have additional applications such
as finding important links in a protein-protein network, anti-terrorism network, and brain
functionality [23, 82, 71, 145]. To the best of our knowledge, the M IN C ONNECT model
is one of the few interdiction models that minimize the number of pairwise connections
by removing a set of links. Thus, the M IN C ONNECT model has potential applications
in problems such as synthesizing distributed firewall configurations in a computer network
[165]. Recall that the other two models considering pairwise connectivity [150, 43] assume
all the nodes to be of the same type.
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Third, the M INAT R ISK model with the same interdiction objective as that of [47] can
be solved to optimality for networks with 200 nodes within reasonable time for several
parameter combinations. These 200 node networks are much larger than the 15 nodes
networks that [47] solved to optimality. In addition, our heuristic algorithms solve problem
instances with 200 nodes in less than 11 minutes compared to 2 hours taken by [47] using
their approximate algorithm. The M INAT R ISK model can also be applied in a similar realworld setting such as the network of residential hotels in which some of the hotels have
number of injection drug users less than a threshold (susceptible), and the other hotels have
number of injection drug users greater than a threshold (infectious) [47]. The problem in
this case is to maximize the number of susceptible hotels completely isolated from the
infectious hotels. [46] found that reactive approaches including the model proposed by
[47] outperform preventive approaches when the surveillance information is not highly
erroneous. We think our paper will complement both of these studies [47, 46] very well
in the sense that we propose four optimization based reactive approaches and compare six
reactive approaches along with a random approach.
Fourth, to the best of our knowledge, no existing link removal method attempts to
control the speed of spread. The speed of spread measures how fast susceptible nodes
become infected, and the less time it takes to infect the same number of susceptible nodes,
the greater the speed of spread. Although the M IN WPATHS model does not use a speed
of spread metric in the objective function, this model along with the algorithm to solve it
performs very well when applied to slow down the spread. Our models can also be used
as part of an algorithm to solve other network interdiction problems [107]. In summary,
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although our models might be limited in direct applicability, they are useful in developing
insight in minimizing spread of infections under different scenarios. They can also be
applied in interdiction problems other than infection control.
Specifically, the contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) four novel network interdiction models formulated as mixed-integer linear programs (MILP), 2) two new heuristic
algorithms for the interdiction models, 3) a comparison of our link removal methods with
several existing methods in minimizing spread, and 4) recommendations, based on our results about which link removal method is the most appropriate in different infection control
scenarios (e.g., reduction of the occurrence of new infections versus slowing down of the
speed of spread).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe the problem
of removing a set of links to minimize the spread of infections in a network. In Section 2.3,
we propose mixed-integer programming formulations of our network interdiction models
and prove several structural properties. In Section 2.4, we provide heuristic algorithms for
solving our models. In Section 2.5, we discuss the computational tractability of our models
and algorithms by reporting the results of a set of experiments. In Section 2.6, we compare
all of the link removal methods via simulation. Finally, in Section 2.7, we conclude our
paper.

2.2

Problem Description
Our mathematical models consist of an undirected graph G = (N, A), where N is a set

of nodes and A = {(i, j) : i ∈ N, j ∈ N, i < j} is a set of links. We assume that G is arbi25

trary, and our knowledge about its topology and other attributes is complete. Depending on
the type of infection, a node might represent a computer, a person, an account on a social
media site, and so on. Similarly, a link might represent a communication channel between
two computers, social contact between two persons, friendship status between two user
accounts, and so on. The models input the state of a system prior to an outbreak, in which
some of the nodes in the network are infected and the rest are susceptible to infection.
Let I ⊆ N be the set of infected nodes, and S = N\I be the set of susceptible nodes. The
problem is to remove a set of links L ⊆ A to minimize the spread of infection in the resulting network, such that the cardinality of L is no greater than some integer parameter b.
Parameter b represents the maximum number of links that can removed using an available
budget.
The spread of infection is represented in this paper by the following metrics: 1) average number of new infections and 2) average time to infect half of the susceptible nodes
to capture the number and speed of occurrence of new infections, respectively. The spread
of infections through a network is inherently stochastic, with an infectious node infecting its neighbors with some probability [76]. However, existing stochastic optimization
approaches such as stochastic programming and simulation-optimization are often computationally intensive. Thus, this paper proposes four deterministic network interdiction
models minimizing four interdiction metrics, and each act as a link removal method to
minimize the spread of infection measured in terms of the two aforementioned spread of
infections metrics. In turn, this paper evaluates and compares the average performances
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of these four methods along with some existing methods in an stochastic environment by
estimating the spread of infections metrics using a stochastic simulation.

2.3

Model Formulations
In terms of the objectives and the formulations, M IN C ONNECT and M INAT R ISK mod-

els are similar, and M IN PATHS and M IN WPATHS models are similar. M IN C ONNECT and
M INAT R ISK models optimize the number of connections. In contrast, M IN PATHS and
M IN WPATHS models optimize the number of transmission paths. We used the same notations for all the parameters and variables that are common in all the formulations to avoid
repetition. We should mention here that any link between any pair of infected nodes is
removed before building the corresponding formulations because these links are unable to
transmit any infection.
The following terms are used in describing our four models:

2.3.1

Definition 1 (Transmission path)

If a path between two nodes (at least one of them is susceptible) contains no other
infected nodes, it is a transmission path. If both of the nodes are susceptible, infection can
transmit through the path when one of them becomes infected, and no other nodes on the
path become infected at the same time. Thus, a transmission path in the initial state of
the network might not remain a transmission path after infections start spreading because
both of the end nodes, or one or more of the intermediate nodes might become infected.
However, our models take only the initial state of the network into account.
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2.3.2

Definition 2 (Connection)

Two nodes, at least one of them susceptible, have one pairwise connection if there is at
least one transmission path between them.

2.3.3

Definition 3 (Susceptible node at risk of infection)

A susceptible node is at risk of infection if it has at least one pairwise connection with
the infected nodes, and the susceptible node is saved from infection if it is no longer at risk
of infection in the interdicted network.

2.3.4

M IN C ONNECT Model

The first model, M IN C ONNECT, minimizes the number of pairwise connections between infected and susceptible nodes.
Let, Ni be the set of neighbors of node i, and Ω = {(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ N × N, j > i, (i, j) ∈
/
I × I}. Ω is the set of distinct pairs of nodes, and at least one of the nodes in each pair is
susceptible. The decision variables are as follows.
The M IN C ONNECT model is formulated as follows.
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(M IN C ONNECT) min

∑ ∑ xi j

(2.1)

xi j + yi j ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ A

(2.2)

xki − xk j + y ji ≥ 0

(2.3)

i∈S j∈I

s.t.

∀(k, i) ∈ Ω,

∀ j ∈ Ni , k 6= j, j ∈
/I

∑

yi j ≤ b

(2.4)

(i, j)∈A

xi j ≥ 0

∀(i, j) ∈ Ω

yi j ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ A

(2.5)
(2.6)

The objective function (2.1) counts the total number of pairwise connections between
the infected and susceptible nodes. Constraint (2.2) makes sure that two neighboring nodes
i and j are connected (xi j = 1) if the link (i, j) between them is not removed. Constraint
(2.3) makes sure that a node k is connected to node i if node k is connected to node j
and the link (i, j) is not removed. Constraints (2.2) and (2.3) together with the objective
function (2.1) ensure that xi j = 1 if and only if there exists at least one path of unremoved
links between i and j. There is no constraint (2.3) for nodes i and k if both of them are
infected. There is no constraint (2.3) for nodes i and k through node j if node j is infected.
Constraint (2.4) is the budget constraint. Corollary 2.3.4.4 shows that xi j variables will be
binary in an optimal solution.
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2.3.4.1

Lemma 1 (Implied lower bound)

An implied lower bound on xi j is either 0 or 1 for all (i, j) ∈ Ω in any feasible solution
of the M IN C ONNECT model.
Proof: The proof is divided into two cases. Cases 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive for a pair
of nodes (i, j).

2.3.4.2

Case 1

Nodes i and j have one or more transmission paths. If y pq = 0 where (p, q) ∈ A for
all of the links on a transmission path, then x pq ≥ 1 for all the links on that transmission
path. From constraint (2.3), xi j ≥ 1. If y pq = 1 for at least one link on the transmission
path, from constraint (2.3), xi j ≥ 0. In this way, either xi j ≥ 0 or xi j ≥ 1 resulting from that
transmission path. The same is true for all the transmission paths between nodes i and j.

2.3.4.3

Case 2

If there is no transmission path between nodes i and j, constraint (2.5) ensures that
xi j ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ Ω.
It is clear from the above cases that the implied lower bound on xi j is either 0 or 1 for
all (i, j) ∈ Ω in any feasible solution of the M IN C ONNECT model.

2.3.4.4

Corollary 1

An optimal solution to M IN C ONNECT exists such that xi j ∈ {0, 1} for all (i, j) ∈ Ω.
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From Lemma 2.3.4.1, it is obvious that xi j ∈ {0, 1} for all (i, j) ∈ Ω in any optimal solution of the M IN C ONNECT model because it is a minimization problem with an objective
function of the sum of xi j variables.
We now show that the M IN C ONNECT model is a general case of the critical link detection problem in [150] when the metric, number of pairwise connections is minimized
in this problem. Let both of the sets S and I be substituted by N in the M IN C ONNECT
formulation. In addition, redefine the set Ω as Ω = {(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ N × N, j > i}, and
redefine the constraint (2.3) as xki − xk j + y ji ≥ 0

∀(k, i) ∈ Ω, ∀ j ∈ Ni , k 6= j. With these

modifications, the M IN C ONNECT formulation now minimizes the number of pairwise connections between any pair of nodes. Hence, the M IN C ONNECT Model is a general case of
the critical link detection problem.

2.3.5

M IN AT R ISK Model

The second model, M INAT R ISK, minimizes the number of susceptible nodes at risk of
infection. This metric is the same as the metric in [47]. However, the formulation in [47] is
a non-linear program, while we present a mixed-integer linear programming formulation
below.
Compared to the M IN C ONNECT formulation, this formulation uses an additional decision variable
 zi as defined below.



1 if susceptible node iis at risk of infection
zi =



0 otherwise
The M INAT R ISK model is formulated as follows.
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(M INAT R ISK) min

∑ zi

(2.7)

(2.2) − −(2.6)

(2.8)

zi − xi j ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S, j ∈ I

(2.9)

i∈S

s.t.

The objective function (2.7) counts the number of susceptible nodes at risk of infection.
The additional constraint (2.9) makes sure that a susceptible node is at risk of infection if
it is connected to one or more of the infected nodes. Lemma 2.3.5 proves that zi variables
will always be binary in an optimal solution.
An optimal solution to M INAT R ISK exists such that zi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ S.
In the M INAT R ISK formulation, xi j ≥ 0 or xi j ≥ 1 for all (i, j) ∈ Ω from Constraint
(2.8) based on Lemma 2.3.4.1. Now, from constraint (2.9), zi ≥ 0 or zi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ S.
Hence, zi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ S in the optimal solution since M INAT R ISK is a minimization
problem with an objective function of the sum of zi variables.
Let, M INAT R ISK -Z be a variation of the M INAT R ISK formulation such that the binary
constraint yi j ∈ {0, 1} for all (i, j) ∈ A in (2.8) is replaced with 0 ≤ yi j ≤ 1 for all (i, j)
in A, and the constraint zi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ S is added. Lemma 2.3.5.1 shows that any
optimal fractional yi j solution of the M INAT R ISK -Z formulation can be converted to an
optimal binary solution by simply setting the fractional yi j values to 0. This finding is particularly important because M INAT R ISK -Z is much more computationally efficient than
the M INAT R ISK formulation (see Section 2.5).
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2.3.5.1

Lemma 1

Any optimal solution of the M INAT R ISK -Z formulation which has some fractional yi j
values can be converted to yi j ∈ {0, 1} for all (i, j) ∈ A by setting the fractional yi j values
to 0, and the resulting objective function value is equal to the optimal objective function
value of the M INAT R ISK formulation.
Proof: The proof is divided into two cases as follows.

2.3.5.2

Case 1

Let us first examine the solution of the M INAT R ISK formulation if the binary constraint
yi j ∈ {0, 1} for all (i, j) ∈ A is removed. Suppose, the set of all the susceptible nodes is
divided into two sets S1 and S2. Nodes in S1 are connected to nodes in I through a set of
links L1, where |L1| > b, and nodes in S2 are connected to nodes in I through a set of links
L2, where |L2| = b. From constraints (2.8) and (2.9), it is possible to have a solution such
b
< 1 for all (i, j) ∈ L1 and yi j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ L2 where ∑(i, j)∈L1 yi j = b
that 0 ≤ yi j = |L1|
b
if |S1|  |S2|. This is due to the reduction in the objective function |S1| × |L1|
> |S2|.

The quantity in the right side of this inequality is the reduction in the objective function if
the solution is yi j = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ L2 and yi j = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ L1. So, the fractional
solution is superior to the binary solution (Figure 2.1). However, for the M INAT R ISK -Z
formulation and for the same fractional solution, the reduction in the objective function
is 0 < |S2| because zi = 1 in any solution in which zi > 0 from constraint zi ∈ {0, 1} for
all i ∈ S. So, the binary solution is superior to the fractional solution (Figure 2.2). For
the M INAT R ISK formulation, the binary solution is automatically selected. Figures 2.1
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and 2.2 are for the same problem, and figure 2.3 is for a different problem. Red and blue
nodes are infected and susceptible, respectively. Links with fractional values on them are
partially removed; links without any value are not removed; and links with value 1 are
completely removed.

2.3.5.3

Case 2

If |L2| < b < |L1|, and more than b − |L2| links need to be removed to save one more
node (Figure 2.3), the extra budget b − |L2| cannot be used to save any more nodes after
saving the nodes in S2. So, in the optimal solution if 0 < yi j < 1 for any (i, j) ∈ L1, they
can be set to 0 without altering the objective function. Also, if b > |L| in the trivial case,
where L is the set of all the links connected to the infected nodes, the extra budget b − |L|
cannot be used because there is no remaining susceptible nodes to be saved (Figure 2.3). In
this figure, after removing the three links connected to node 7, the additional link allowed
to be removed is not able to save another node. This results in arbitrary partial removal of
some of the links. So, in the optimal solution if 0 < yi j < 1 for any (i, j) ∈ A\L, these yi j s
can be set to 0 without altering the objective function. For the M INAT R ISK formulation,
in both |L2| < b < |L1| and b > |L| scenarios, links corresponding to the extra budget are
automatically set to either 0 or 1.
In both cases, after setting the relevant yi j s to 0, the optimal solution will be yi j ∈ {0, 1}
for all (i, j) ∈ A, and the optimal objective function value of the M INAT R ISK formulation
is equal to the optimal objective function value of the M INAT R ISK -Z formulation.
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Figure 2.1
Solution to M INAT R ISK -Z without the binary constraint z ∈ {0, 1} (b = 1)

Figure 2.2
Solution to M INAT R ISK -Z (b = 1)
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Figure 2.3
Solution to M INAT R ISK -Z (b = 4)
2.3.6

M IN PATHS Model

The M IN PATHS model maximizes the number of transmission paths removed from the
network.
Let, Puv be the set of transmission paths between infected node u and susceptible node
v, and Luvw be the set of links belonging to the wth transmission path in Puv . We use a
modified depth-first search algorithm to find all the Luvw sets. The additional decision
variable used
 in this model is as follows.



1 if the transmission path win Puv is removed
tuvw =



0 otherwise
The M IN PATHS model is formulated as follows.

36

(M IN PATHS) max

tuvw

∑∑ ∑

(2.10)

u∈I v∈S w∈Puv

s.t.

tuvw −

yi j ≤ 0 ∀u ∈ I, v ∈ S, w ∈ Puv

∑

(2.11)

(i, j)∈Luvw

tuvw ≤ 1

∑

∀u ∈ I, v ∈ S, w ∈ Puv

yi j ≤ b

(2.12)
(2.13)

(i, j)∈A

yi j ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ A

(2.14)

Objective function (2.10) counts the number of transmission paths removed from the
network. Constraints (2.13) and (2.14) are the same as the constraints (2.4) and (2.6),
respectively, in the M IN C ONNECT model. Constraint (2.12) makes sure that if none of
the links on the wth transmission path between infected node u and susceptible node v is
removed, the wth transmission path is not removed. Constraint (2.14) guarantees that the
values of the path removal variables do not exceed 1. Note that although we do not restrict
tuvw s to be binary, the formulation guarantees binary values of this variable in an optimal
solution of the model, satisfying the binary requirement in our definition of transmission
paths.

2.3.7

M IN WPATHS Model

The M IN WPATHS model minimizes the total weight of the transmission paths between
all the infected nodes and all the susceptible nodes in the induced network. The weight
of a transmission path is the product of the transmission probabilities on each of the links
on that path. We assume that the probability of transmission on a link is readily available. Although use of transmission probability is a common feature in epidemiological
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studies [94], estimation of this probability might be very difficult in reality. Note that the
M IN WPATHS and the M IN PATHS models are the same except for their objective functions.
Let, p be the probability of an infected node infecting a neighboring susceptible node,
and let puvw be the probability of transmission from infected node u to susceptible node v
on the wth transmission path between them. Then, puvw is the weight of this path, and it is
calculated as puvw = p|Luvw | . The M IN WPATHS model is formulated as follows.

(M IN WPATHS) max

∑∑ ∑

puvwtuvw

(2.15)

u∈I v∈S w∈Puv

(2.11)–(2.14)

(2.16)

Objective function (2.15) ascertains the total number of weighted paths between all the
infected and susceptible nodes.

2.4

Solution Algorithms
At first, we solve the interdiction models for some of the problem instances using the

commercial solver CPLEX [36] to understand the need for developing any algorithm. It
is clear that the M IN C ONNECT and M INAT R ISK models cannot be solved for large problems, e.g., problems with 300 nodes and average node degree 4 within reasonable time
(two hours) for most of the parameter combinations. Motivated by the previous studies
that successfully develop computationally efficient algorithms using Benders decomposition [35], we also develop and test algorithm based on these decomposition technique.
However, Benders decomposition of the M INAT R ISK formulation is slower than its direct
solution using CPLEX. Refer to the supplemental material for a complete description of
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the Benders formulation, algorithm, and computational results. On the other hand, there
are potentially exponential number of paths between all the infected nodes and all the susceptible nodes in a network. It means that the MILP formulations of the M IN PATHS and
the M IN WPATHS models can only be built and solved for small networks (less than 20
nodes). Thus, we develop Monte Carlo-based heuristic algorithms for the four models
in the following sub-sections and demonstrate the performance of the algorithms in the
computational experiments in section 2.5.

2.4.1

Heuristic algorithm for the M IN C ONNECT Model

Input: Budget = b.
Output: Set of arcs selected = L.
1. Evaluate each arc, a in A.
2. Randomly select b − |L| − 1 other arcs.
3. Select the arc removing most number of connections.
4. A = A\a, L = L + a.
5. If |L| = b, return. Else, go to step 1.

Algorithm 2.4.1 is the heuristic algorithm for the M IN C ONNECT model. The potential
of a link to minimize the number of connections is estimated by temporarily removing this
link along with some other links to fill out the budgeted quota of links that can be removed
and then, counting the number of connections between the infected and susceptible nodes
in the resulting network.
The parameter M controls the number of times a set of links is randomly removed in the
M IN C ONNECT and the M INAT R ISK models and the number of trees generated randomly
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from each of the infected nodes at the beginning in the algorithms for the M INPATHS and
the M IN WPATHS models. In other words, M is the number of replications in the random
selection processes of the heuristic algorithms.

2.4.2

Heuristic algorithm for the M IN AT R ISK Model

We do not present the heuristic algorithm for the M INAT R ISK model separately because this algorithm and the heuristic algorithm for the M IN C ONNECT model are very
similar. In this algorithm, instead of CAi , RAi is calculated in each replication of a link,
where RAi is the number of susceptible nodes at risk of infection in that replication. Then,
ibest at any iteration of the while loop is selected based on T RAi rather than TCAi , where
T RAi is the total number of susceptible nodes remaining at risk of infection when link Ai is
evaluated.

2.4.3

Heuristic algorithm for the M IN WPATHS Model

Input: Budget = b.
Output: Set of arcs selected = L.
1. Randomly generate M trees from the graph.
2. Evaluate each arc, a in A.
3. Select the arc removing most number of paths in the M trees.
4. Select the arc a removing most number of connections.
5. A = A\a, L = L + a.
6. If |L| = b, return. Else, go to step 2.
Algorithm 2.4.3 is the algorithm for the M IN PATHS model. In this algorithm, M random trees, each consisting of paths from the infected nodes to the susceptible nodes are
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generated initially. Then, at each iteration of the main loop, the link that removes the maximum number of paths between the infected and susceptible nodes in the trees is removed
from the network. At an iteration, the number of paths removed by a link is calculated by
temporarily removing the link from the network and counting the number of paths removed
from the remaining paths as a result of removing the link under consideration.

2.5

Computational Experiments
In this section, we investigate the computation times of the models for several different

network sizes and problem configurations. Network size here means the number of nodes,
and problem configuration means a specific combination of the fraction of nodes infected
and fraction of links removed. Unless mentioned otherwise, Random network [48] is the
underlying network type used in the experiments of this paper. The other network type used
is the Scale-free network [14]. Note that Random networks are different than randomlygenerated networks. All the networks (both Random and Scale-free) used in this paper are
randomly generated and have an average node degree of 4. Thus, the number of links in any
of the networks is approximately double of the number of nodes. However, two networks
with the same network size might have a different number of links between infected nodes,
and these links are removed before building the models. Therefore, the number of links
might have minor variation even for the same network size when they are input into the
optimization models. All the experiments were carried out on a computer with an Intel
core i7 2.90GHz processor and 8GB RAM.
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At first, we report the computation times of direct solutions of the M IN C ONNECT and
the M INAT R ISK models by CPLEX. We do not report the computation times of the M IN PATHS and the M IN WPATHS models by CPLEX as they can be solved for only small
networks. Then, we evaluate the quality of the solutions by the heuristic algorithms on
both Random and Scale-free networks in terms of the proportion of their solutions that are
optimal and the average optimality gap. We also report the computation times required by
the heuristic algorithms to solve problems with up to 200 nodes.

Average Computation Time (Sec)
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In f ected10% LinksRemoved10%
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In f ected20% LinksRemoved20%
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Figure 2.4
Computational performance of the M IN C ONNECT model

2.5.1

M IN C ONNECT Model

We found that the computation time for solving this model using CPLEX varies a great
deal even for problem instances with similar numbers of nodes, links, and budget (b). This
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is in fact true for both the M IN C ONNECT and the M INAT R ISK models. This indicates
that problem instances become easy or difficult to solve depending on the positions of
the infected and susceptible nodes in the network. Figure 2.4 shows the variation of the
average computation time with respect to the network size for different problem configurations. The average computation time corresponding to a specific network size and problem
configuration is taken over 10 problem instances.

2.5.2

M IN AT R ISK Model

Recall that the M INAT R ISK model and the model proposed by [47] have the same
network interdiction objective. However, unlike the non-linear programming formulation
in [47], we formulate the problem as a mixed-integer linear program which can be solved
by a commercial solver such as CPLEX for relatively large problems. [47] present an
approximate algorithm that can solve problem instances with 200 nodes in about 2 hours.
The equivalent MILP formulation proposed in this paper, especially the M INAT R ISK -Z
formulation, can be solved to optimality by CPLEX for problems with 150 nodes in less
than 2 hours for almost all the parameter combinations, and for problems with 200 nodes
for several parameter combinations (figure 2.6).
Figure 2.5 juxtaposes the average computation times of the M INAT R ISK-Z and the
M INAT R ISK formulations. The average computation times are taken over 10 problem instances for each network size. Figure 2.5 shows that the average computation time of the
M INAT R ISK-Z formulation is less than that of the M INAT R ISK formulations, and also the
former increases slower than the latter as the number of nodes increases. In fact, the com43

putation times for the M INAT R ISK-Z formulation are always less than the corresponding
computation times for the M INAT R ISK formulation irrespective of the problem configuration and network size. The main reason for the faster computation of M INAT R ISK -Z is
that M INAT R ISK -Z has approximately half as many binary variables as in the M INAT R ISK
formulations for the networks with average node degree of 4. Therefore, M INAT R ISK -Z
is expected to perform even better compared to the M INAT R ISK formulation for denser

Average Computation Time (sec.)

networks.
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2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
20

40

80 100
60
Number of nodes

120

Figure 2.5
Performance of the M INAT R ISK and M INAT R ISK -Z formulations

Figure 2.6 shows the variation of the average computation time with respect to the network size for different problem configurations. Most of the 100 node problem instances
with 10% nodes infected and 10% links removed cannot be solved. Thus, the average computation time is 7200 seconds because the experiments are terminated after that time. The
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same applies for this problem configuration for the 150 and 200 node problem instances.
Most of the 200 node problem instances with 20% infected and 20% links removed also
cannot be solved. Of the 200 node problem instances with 20% infected and 10% links removed, 29% can be solved to optimality in 2 hours, and the instances that cannot be solved
to optimality for this configuration have an average optimality gap of 5.6% at termination.
All the 200 node problem instances for the other 2 configurations are solved to optimality.
Figure 2.6 demonstrates an interesting behavior of the computation times of the M I NAT R ISK -Z

formulation for different problem configurations. The average computation

time corresponding to a specific network size and problem configuration is taken over 10
problem instances. Apparently, the computation time varies significantly with the ratio between the fraction of nodes infected and the fraction of links removed. When the fraction
of nodes infected and the fraction of links removed are equal, the number of links that can
be removed is half of the number of links connected to the infected nodes. This likely
increases the number of feasible solutions, making the problem combinatorially more difficult. Thus, the average computation time increases as the ratio becomes closer to one.

2.5.3

Heuristic Algorithms

To evaluate the performance of the heuristic algorithms, we randomly generated 100
Random networks, each with 12 nodes, for several problem configurations. Recall that the
M IN PATHS and M IN WPATHS models can only be solved by CPLEX for small networks.
Therefore, to keep the same basis of comparison for all the algorithms, we used networks
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Figure 2.6
Computational performance of the M INAT R ISK -Z model
with 12 nodes for the performance evaluation. The values of M (number of replications)
are set to 100 in all of the heuristic algorithms.
According to Figure 2.7, A LGORITHM -M IN C ONNECT and A LGORITHM -M INAT R ISK
found optimal solutions more than 60% and 70% of the times, respectively, on Random
networks. The solid and dash bordered columns show the average performance on Random and Scale-free network, respectively. On the other hand, A LGORITHM -M IN PATHS
and A LGORITHM -M IN WPATHS found optimal solutions only about 15% and 23% of the
times, respectively, on random networks. However, according to Figure 2.8, their average
optimality gaps were both less than 5%. All of the algorithms perform slightly better on
Scale-free networks. Optimality and gap of a solution is determined by comparing with the
optimal solution found by CPLEX. The solid and dash bordered columns show the average
performance on Random and Scale-free network, respectively.
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Figure 2.7
Fraction of solutions that are optimal
Figure 2.9 presents average run times of the heuristic algorithms for different network
sizes and problem configuration with 20% initially infected, 10% fraction of arcs removed,
and 0.15 as the probability of transmission. The average computation times are taken over
10 problem instances for each network size. Figure 2.9 shows that on average, the heuristic
algorithm for the M INAT R ISK model takes about 600 seconds to solve the 200 nodes
problems, and this is the longest time taken by any algorithm. The approximate algorithm
proposed by [47] takes 2 hours to solve a problem of similar size. However, unlike our
heuristic algorithms, their approximate algorithm provides performance guarantee. The
heuristic algorithms for the M IN PATHS and the M IN WPATHS models solve the 200 nodes
problems within a few seconds.
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Figure 2.9
Computational performance of the heuristic algorithms
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2.6

Comparison of Link Removal Methods in Minimizing Spread
Recall that our network interdiction models have connectivity-related interdiction ob-

jectives. These objectives are different than spread related objectives such as minimizing
or slowing down the spread, measured respectively, by the metrics, average new infections
and time to infect half of the susceptible nodes. Therefore, to evaluate the effectiveness of
these models and their associated heuristic algorithms as link removal methods in minimizing or slowing down the spread, we estimate the average new infections and time to infect
half of the susceptible nodes using simulation after removing the links from the network
prescribed by these methods. To compare our methods with three existing methods, we
estimate the above two metrics for the existing methods also using simulation. Thus, the
methods evaluated in this section are:
1. Optimal solution of M IN C ONNECT / Heuristic algorithm solution of M IN C ONNECT.
2. Optimal solution of M INAT R ISK / Heuristic algorithm solution of M INAT R ISK.
3. Optimal solution of M IN PATHS / Heuristic algorithm solution of M IN PATHS.
4. Optimal solution of M IN WPATHS / Heuristic algorithm solution of M IN WPATHS.
5. R AND D EL. In this link removal method, a set of b links are randomly removed
from the network. Then, a simulation is run on the residual network to estimate the
spread related metrics. The performance of this method is evaluated as the average
simulated performance over M replications.
6. G REEDY D EL. In this method, proposed by [76], links are iteratively removed from
the network using a metric called the minimum average contamination degree. A link
to be evaluated in the remaining network is temporarily removed from the network.
Next, a random number is generated for each of the links in the network, and the links
having corresponding random numbers greater than the probability of transmission
are temporarily removed from the network. Then, the contamination of the link
under evaluation is calculated as the total number of susceptible nodes at risk of
infection in the remaining network. The above two steps are carried out M times,
and a total of M contamination degrees are estimated. The average contamination
degree is then calculated as the average of the M contamination degrees. Average
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contamination degree is calculated for all the other links in the same way, and the link
with the minimum average contamination degree is removed from the network. The
algorithm proceeds to the next iteration and recalculates the average contamination
degrees of the remaining links. The algorithm terminates after removing a total of b
links.
7. B ETWEEN D EL. The algorithm removes links in order of an adapted version of
betweenness centrality proposed by [47]. The betweenness centrality score (c(a)) of
a link is a standard metric for evaluating the importance of a link in maintaining the
connectivity of the network. This metric is determined by calculating the proportion
of shortest paths between two nodes that pass over the link and then summing the
proportions over all pairs of nodes in the network. The adapted betweenness measure
proposed by [47] is calculated in the same way, but it only includes paths between
pairs of one infected and one susceptible node (Equation (2.17)).
c(a) =

φ (i, j|a)
φ (i, j)
(i, j)∈I×S

∑

(2.17)

Here, φ (i, j|a) is the number of shortest paths between infected node i and susceptible
node j on which link a is one of the links. φ (i, j) is the total number of shortest paths between node i and node j. Then, the heuristic algorithm works as follows. At each iteration,
the link among the remaining links having the maximum centrality score is removed from
the network. Then, similar to the G REEDY D EL algorithm, this algorithm also proceeds
to the next iteration and recalculates the centrality score of all the remaining links. The
algorithm terminates after removing a total of b links.
To evaluate any of these seven methods on a particular problem instance, we do the
following: 1) generate the network, 2) obtain a solution from the method, 3) remove the
links from the network that are prescribed by the solution, and then 4) run a simulation of
infection spread on the residual network.
We use discrete time stochastic susceptible-infectious (SI) and susceptible-infectiousrecovered (SIR) simulations to compare the performances of all the link removal methods.
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In both the SI and SIR simulations, at each iteration (tick), a random number is generated
for each of the links. Then, all the infected nodes infect their susceptible neighbors if the
corresponding random numbers are less than the probability of transmission. In the SI
simulation, infected nodes do not recover from infection. Whereas, in the SIR simulation,
there is a fixed probability of recovery for the infected nodes. In this simulation, if the
random number generated corresponding to an infected node is less than the probability
of recovery, that infected node recovers from infection and becomes immune from further
infection.
After running a simulation, two performance metrics are estimated: 1) Expected number of new infections (E(Inew )) and 2) Expected time to infect half of the susceptible nodes
(E(T )). E(Inew ) is estimated from the SIR simulation. E(T ) is estimated from the SI simulation. E(Inew ) and E(T ) represents the occurrence and speed of the spread of infections,
respectively. E(Inew ) is estimated from the SIR simulation because it is realistic enough
to be applicable in most of the spreading scenarios. However, the spread might die out
before infecting half of the susceptible nodes if the nodes recover from infection making it
difficult to estimate E(T ). Hence, E(T ) is estimated from the SI simulation.

2.6.1

Experimental Setup

A total of 1000 simulation replications were carried out to estimate the performance
metrics for each of the different combinations of the following parameters: probability of
transmission, initial fraction of nodes infected, fraction of links that can be removed, and
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network size (number of nodes). Table 2.1 shows the different values of parameters for
which simulations were run.
Table 2.1
Parameters and their values in the experiments
Parameter
Values
Transmission probability 0.05, 0.15, 0.25, 0.9
Initial fraction infected
0.1, 0.2, 0.3
Fraction of links removed
0.1, 0.2
Network size
12, 50, 150

We compare the link removal methods both based on the optimal solutions of our models and also based on the solutions using the heuristic algorithms. Recall that the MinPaths
and the MinWPaths models can only be solved for small networks. Thus, we use networks
of 12 nodes for the comparisons involving optimal solutions and networks of 150 nodes
for the comparisons involving heuristic algorithm solutions. We performed the former set
of comparisons (Figures 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17) only on Random networks, but the latter set of comparisons (Figures 2.18, 2.19, 2.20, 2.21) on both
Random and Scale-free networks. (See the plots from experiments involving heuristic algorithm solutions on random networks in section 2 of the supplemental material. To be
concise, we provide plots for only two parameter combinations in figures 2.18, 2.19, 2.20,
2.21 as opposed to plots for four combinations in figures 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.14, 2.15,
2.16, and 2.17. However, the omission does not cause any loss of generality of the associated discussion and conclusion because the omitted plots exhibit similar patterns as the
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plots included in the paper.) Networks of 150 nodes are used in the experiments involving
Scale-free networks. Note that the legend above figure 2.10 is applicable for all the plots
used in the comparisons.

2.6.2

Comparison of the methods

Figures 2.10 ( Infected = 10%, Links removed = 10%), 2.11 (Infected = 20%, Links
removed = 20%), 2.12 (Infected = 30%, Links removed = 10%), 2.13 (Infected = 30%,
Links removed = 20%), 2.14, 2.15 (Infected = 20%, Links removed = 20%), 2.16 (Infected = 30%, Links removed = 10%), 2.17 (Infected = 30%, Links removed = 20%), 2.18
(Infected = 20%, Links removed = 20%), 2.19 (Infected = 30%, Links removed = 20%),
2.20 (Infected = 20%, Links removed = 20%), 2.21 (Infected = 30%, Links removed =
20%) show how the relative effectiveness of the link removal methods vary with respect to
transmission probability. This plots are created using normalized values of E(INEW ) and
E(T ). The value in the denominator is the maximum taken across the seven methods for
each combination of parameter settings. Models are solved to optimality using CPLEX.
Random network, n=12.
It is clear from figures 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.18, 2.19 that the M INAT R ISK model
is much more effective than all the other methods in minimizing the spread of infections
when both the transmission probability and the fraction of initially infected nodes are not
very low, and the relative effectiveness of the M INAT R ISK model increases monotonically
with transmission probability irrespective of the problem configuration and topological
characteristicsIt is also clear from these figures that as the fraction of infected nodes in53

creases relative to the fraction of links that can be removed, the transmission probability
beyond which the M INAT R ISK model is more effective than other methods decreases. For
example, in figure 2.18, 0.1 is the transmission probability beyond which the M INAT R ISK
model is the most effective, and in figure 2.19 that transmission probability is 0.05. The
ratio

In f ected
Links removed

20%
is equal to 1 ( 20%
) in figure 2.18 and 1.5 ( 30%
20% ) in figure 2.19. Both of

these findings suggest that when the infection is highly virulent or too many nodes are
infected, probability is very high that infection will reach a susceptible node if the susceptible node is not completely isolated from the infected nodes because there are too many
high probability transmission paths through which infection can transmit to the susceptible
node.
Figures 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.12, 2.18, 2.19 also show that when the transmission probability is very low, M IN WPATHS is the most effective in minimizing the spread of infections. It suggests that the infected nodes recover before spreading infections through paths
of low transmission probability. Thus, only the paths of highest transmission probability
need to be removed. G REEDY B ET and G REEDY D EL methods are comparable with the
M IN WPATHS model in most of the scenarios with low transmission probability. One possible explanation for the similarity of the performances of the G REEDY B ET model and the
M IN WPATHS model is that both of them are calculating two different types of centrality
of a link. The G REEDY B ET model calculates centrality considering the paths of highest weight between all pairs of infected and susceptible nodes, whereas the M IN WPATHS
model calculates centrality considering the paths of highest weight regardless of whether
the paths represent all infected-susceptible node pairs or not. One possible reason for the
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similarity between the G REEDY D EL model and the M IN WPATHS model is that both of
these models consider transmission probability as a criterion for evaluating a link.

MinConnect
MinPaths
GreedyBet
GreedyDel

E(INEW )
max E(INEW )

1

MinAtRisk
MinW Paths
Random

0.8

0.6
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0.2
0.4
0.8
0.6
Transmission Probability

Figure 2.10
Effectiveness of the methods in minimizing spread 1

Figures 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17, 2.20, 2.21 demonstrate that the M IN WPATHS model
is the most effective in slowing down the spread when the probability of transmission is
not very high. Effectiveness of the G REEDY D EL and the G REEDY B ET methods are the
closest to the M IN WPATHS model for low transmission probabilities. However, as the
probability of transmission increases, effectiveness of the M IN WPATHS model drops and
becomes worse than the G REEDY B ET and G REEDY D EL methods in most scenarios. The
effectiveness of the G REEDY B ET method is not particularly consistent. In some scenarios,
it is the second or the third most effective method at low transmission probabilities and the
most effective method at high transmission probabilities (Figures 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17,
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Effectiveness of the methods in minimizing spread 4
and 2.20). But, in some other scenarios, the effectiveness of this method is worse than
most of the other methods (Figure 2.21). The M INAT R ISK model, which is very effective
in minimizing the spread of infections, is inferior in slowing down the speed of spread of
infections in most scenarios. Inferior performance of the M INAT R ISK model is due to the
fact that it spends all the resources needed to isolate a susceptible node without taking into
account the probability of infection transmitting to that node. However, the M INAT R ISK
model performs quite well in figure 2.21. This is an indication that when there are many
infected nodes and not enough links can be removed, complete isolation of the susceptible
nodes is a good method also to slow down the spread.
Figures 2.18 (Infected = 20%, Links removed = 20%), 2.19 (Infected = 30%, Links
removed = 20%), 2.20 (Infected = 20%, Links removed = 20%), and 2.21 (Infected = 30%,
Links removed = 20%) show the effectiveness of the link removal methods to minimize
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Effectiveness of the methods in slowing down spread 4
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the average number of new infections (models are solved by heuristic algorithms) and the
effectiveness in slowing down the spread. Scale-free network with n = 150 are used.
The patterns of the plots in figures 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.12, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17 are
similar to their counterparts in figures 2.18, 2.19, 2.20, and 2.21. Recall that the figures
2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.12, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17 are generated using the optimal solutions (by
CPLEX) of our models, whereas, the figures 2.18, 2.19, 2.20, and 2.21 are generated using
the solutions by the heuristic algorithms. The fact that the patterns are similar is another
validation of the effectiveness of the heuristic algorithms. Moreover, the similarity of the
patterns in figures 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.12, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16, 2.17 with the patterns in figures 2.18, 2.19, 2.20, and 2.21 suggests that the relative effectiveness of the link removal
methods are not highly sensitive to the topological characteristics of the networks. See the
random network counterparts of figures 2.18, 2.19, 2.20, and 2.21 in the supplemental material. However, the superiority of the M INAT R ISK model with respect to the other models
in minimizing the number of new infections is even clearer in the Scale-free network. This
is an indication of the fact that Scale-free networks have a few highly connected nodes and
links, thus making it relatively easy for the M INAT R ISK model to isolate many susceptible
nodes.

2.7

Conclusion
This paper investigates the problem of removing a set of links from a network to min-

imize the spread of infections. For that purpose, we developed four network interdiction
models and formulated them as mixed-integer programs. The interdiction models optimize
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four different connectivity-based interdiction metrics. We also proposed heuristic algorithms for the models. Then, we compared our methods along with random link removal,
a link removal method proposed by [76], and a method based on modified betweenness
centrality proposed by [47] in minimizing the spread of infections. The spread of infection
metrics used in the comparison are average number of new infections and average time to
infect half of the susceptible nodes.
We found that when the probability of transmission is moderate to high and infected
nodes can recover from infection (SIR simulation), the most effective method in minimizing the number of new infections is to remove links in order to minimize the number of
susceptible nodes at risk of infection (M INAT R ISK model). This method is also the most
effective when a large fraction of the nodes are infected, and only a small number of links
can be removed. Thus, when the infection is highly virulent or prevalent, as many susceptible nodes as possible should be completely isolated from the rest of the nodes. The
effectiveness of this method relative to other methods increases with the probability of
transmission and the ratio between the fraction of nodes initially infected and the fraction
of arcs removed. Possible reason for the inferior performance of the M INAT R ISK model at
low transmission probability is that it spends all the resources needed to completely isolate
a node even if it is far from the infected nodes. In contrast, when infected nodes do not
recover from infection (SI simulation) and the transmission probability is low to moderate,
the most effective method in slowing down the spread of infections is to remove links to
reduce the total weight of the transmission paths between infected and susceptible nodes
(M IN WPATHS model). The M IN WPATHS , G REEDY B ET, and the G REEDY D EL models
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show similar performance under many scenarios because all of them are based on different types of link centrality. Therefore, intervention policies should be based on removing
the paths of highest transmission probabilities to slow down the spread for relatively less
virulent infections. This intervention of removing paths of highest transmission probability can be quite useful at the beginning of an outbreak to allow some time before other
interventions become available. The effectiveness of this link removal method relative to
other methods increases as the probability of transmission decreases. Probability of transmission is clearly an important parameter influencing the effectiveness of the link removal
methods.
Results also reveal the computation tractability of the models and algorithms. For
one, the M IN C ONNECT model for 125 node problems can be solved to optimality within
a reasonable time (2 hours). In addition, the M INAT R ISK -Z formulation can be solved
to optimality for 150 node problems for most parameter combinations and for 200 node
problems for several parameter combinations within 2 hours. The equivalent mixed-integer
non-linear programming formulation proposed by [47] can only be solved to optimality for
much smaller networks.
Our heuristic algorithms for the M IN C ONNECT and M INAT R ISK models can solve
problem instances with a network size of 200 nodes in 11 minutes which is less than 2
hours taken by the approximate algorithm proposed by [47]. The heuristic algorithms
for the M IN PATHS and M IN WPATHS models are even faster taking less than a minute to
solve a problem with 200 nodes. On average, more than 60% of of the heuristic algorithm
solutions for the M IN C ONNECT model are optimal, and more than 70% of the heuristic
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algorithm solutions for the M INAT R ISK model are optimal. Average optimality gaps of
the heuristic solutions for the M IN PATHS and M IN WPATHS models are both less than 5%.
In developing our methods, we assume that our knowledge about the topology and
other attributes such as the probability of transmission on the links is complete. These assumptions might limit the direct applicability of our methods in real life settings. However,
our methods can still be useful in conceptual analysis of the characteristics of spread of infections under different scenarios. Various questions related to how infection will spread
with respect to different network topologies, probabilities of transmission, budget, prevalence of infection, etc., can be answered using the methods of this paper. We recommend
our methods to be used more as tools for exploration than for decision making.
For future work, more sophisticated algorithms should be developed to solve larger
problems with performance guarantees. More efficient cutting plane algorithms with novel
valid inequalities should be developed to solve the mixed-integer programming models. In
order to make our methods more realistic, one or more of the assumptions perfect knowledge about the probability of transmission should be relaxed in future works. In a real life
setting, usually both the node-based and link-based interventions are available at the same
time. Thus, this paper can be extended to combined node and link-based infection control.
It will be interesting to study the spread of infection on a transportation network using our
methods. For example, it is not always possible to prevent individual-individual interactions, but interactions of metapopulations such as the connection between two airports can
be prevented. It will be interesting to study the link removal problem considering the network of metapopulations along with the assumption of homogeneous mixing inside each
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metapopulation. Also, determining the topology of a transportation network is expected
to be much easier than determining a human contact network. A study such as this may
produce better results compared to the existing studies such as the study by [90] because
it will capture the initial infection status of the metapopulation, demographic properties
of the metapopulation, and also due to the fact that our interdiction models perform better than the betweenness centrality based models as demonstrated in this paper. Finally,
more experiments should be performed on real life data sets including data sets from other
applications such as the interdiction of a terrorist network.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERDICTING ATTACK GRAPHS TO PROTECT ORGANIZATIONS FROM
CYBER ATTACKS: A BI-LEVEL DEFENDER-ATTACKER MODEL

3.1

Introduction
In order to increase operational efficiency and functionality, organizations, individuals,

and devices are becoming more and more connected, spawning new phenomena such as
the “Internet of Things.” The result is the increasing vulnerability of information to theft
and even disruption of services provided by critical infrastructures. According to the FBI
Internet crime report for 2013 [49], more than 260,000 individuals reported complaints
about their accounts being compromised with a total adjusted loss of more than $781 million. This loss is an increase of 48.8% from $581 million in 2012. In addition to the
plethora of low-profile cyber attacks, there have been several recent high-profile attacks on
corporations such as JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Target. The cyber attack on Target in
2013 resulted in the theft of 40 million credit card numbers and 70 million different pieces
of personal information [128], and the attack on JPMorgan in 2014 compromised information from about 76 million households and 7 million small businesses [154]. Therefore,
maximizing the security of cyber systems is becoming one of the most important tasks of
IT teams in many organizations.
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The security of a network can be enhanced by hardening selected components of the
network in various ways, such as deploying firewalls and intrusion prevention and/or detection systems, finding and patching vulnerabilities, and making configuration changes.
One of the tools for analyzing the security of a network and finding ways to deploy countermeasures is the attack graph, which contains all the paths that can be used to penetrate
a network to breach critical nodes (goal nodes). In this paper, we develop models and
algorithms based on the attack graph of an organization to optimally deploy security countermeasures to protect its informational assets.
[119] first proposed attack graphs as an analysis tool. Attack graphs can be generated
manually or automatically using the following inputs: a database of common attacks broken into atomic steps, information on network topology and configuration, and an attacker
profile [119]. [144] later proposed an automatic attack graph generation tool. Since then,
many researchers have studied attack graphs and proposed a multitude of attack graph variations including attack trees [155], attack countermeasure trees [129], defense trees [22],
and exploit dependency graphs [115]. For a detailed review of many other attack graph
variations, refer to the studies by [86] and [79]. Regardless of the type, an attack graph
can be aggregated to different levels such as a graph of hosts, or a graph of subnets using
different underlying network regularities [114]. As a result, the models and algorithms developed in this paper are also applicable to a physical computer network in which some of
the computers are designated as critical assets, and the attacker tries to breach the critical
assets starting from some noncritical assets and using some other critical or noncritical as-
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sets along the way. In fact, only a few studies so far analyze security based on the physical
computer network rather than attack graphs [9, 166].
Our work complements the existing information security research on attack graph cut
set generation. A cut set can be either complete or partial. Based on the specific study, a
complete cut set, which is also a minimum cut set, is usually defined as the set of initial
security conditions, a set of exploits, or a set of arcs in general; the removal or hardening
of such a cut set also removes all the paths to the goal nodes. In contrast, a partial cut set
is usually generated considering a limited budget for the defender, and the cut set removes
only the most important subset of paths to the goal nodes. [3] propose a formal cost model
that estimates the cost if a critical node is breached. Their cost model can be used to select
the minimum set of initial security conditions, which upon removal, also removes all the
paths from initial conditions to the goal conditions. They also propose an approximation
algorithm to find the minimum set. [7] develop an approach based on genetic algorithm
to find the minimum cut set in dependency attack graphs. This is one of the few studies
that considers arc removal as opposed to node removal. In this paper, we consider that
it might not be optimal to deploy countermeasures on the minimum cut set because both
the defender and the attacker have limited budgets. The study by [68] is another that uses
arc removal for network hardening. [40] propose a multi-objective optimization model
to select a subset of security-hardening measures that minimizes the total damage and the
total cost of security hardening. Their work is one of the few studies that constrain the total
amount spent on security measures. [114] develop a mechanism to cover (i.e., completely
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protect) an attack graph by placing the fewest number of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
sensors.
This work fits into the field of network interdiction, a subset of network optimization
field. The complete or partial removal of an arc is in general referred to as the interdiction of that arc in the network interdiction literature. The problem in this work is a
network interdiction problem because the goal is to generate a partial cut set of arcs to be
interdicted (completely removed). In fact, our work is able to utilize some of the existing
network interdiction ideas and methodologies. At the same time, our work also extends the
network interdiction literature by providing an effective new model and algorithm and applying them in a new manner. Our model and algorithm can also be adapted for variations
of existing network interdiction applications, such as interdiction of a nuclear weapons
project to maximize the minimum completion time of the project, [25, 125], interdiciton
of an electric power grid to assess the vulnerability [132, 133], monitoring drinking water
supply for quick detection of contamination [17, 18, 19, 101, 100, 152], interdiction in
hazardous materials transportation to minimize the discharge damage and transportation
cost [163], and interdiction of a nuclear smuggling network [99, 109, 116, 142]. From the
modeling perspective, our work is most closely related to the work by [116]; in both their
work and our work, the network is interdicted to prevent some flow from reaching a set
of destinations. However, [116] interdict arcs in a nuclear material smuggling network to
minimize a stochastic maximum reliability path, and our work interdicts arcs in an attack
graph to minimize the maximum damage that can be caused through breach of critical assets (goal nodes) by an attacker. Although the selection of an origin destination pair by
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an attacker in their work is stochastic, they assume that the attacker selects only a single
origin-destination pair in a specific realization. In our work, an attacker can use any one
or more origins (initially vulnerable nodes) to initiate attacks and breach any one or more
destinations (goal nodes).
In this paper, we study the strategic interaction between the defender of an organization and an attacker, modeling a two-player resource allocation game over an attack graph.
Related to our work, [41] propose a multi-objective optimization model that poses the
interaction between the attacker and the defender as an arms race. They use a genetic
algorithm to solve the defender’s problem and the attacker’s problem, and they use competitive co-evolution to solve the combined problem to find the Nash equilibrium. [170]
propose a new automated response approach called the Response and Recovery Engine. In
this engine, adversaries are modeled as opponents in a two-player Stackelberg stochastic
game.
To the best of our knowledge, most of the existing literature related to cut set generation
analyzes attack graphs composed of only one goal node. None of these studies consider
multiple goal nodes that each have different costs of breach. Goal nodes are indeed different; for example, the loss due to the breach of a database server of an e-commerce
portal that contains credit card information is probably not the same as the loss due to the
breach of an internal mail server. None of these studies consider intermediate nodes as goal
nodes. In reality, merging all the attack graphs of an organization produces intermediate
goal nodes. Thus, inclusion of intermediate nodes as goal nodes can increase flexibility
both in generation and analysis of attack graphs because the merged attack graphs can be
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analyzed without removing the intermediate goal nodes. There is a scarcity of rigorous
mathematical models that analyzes the attack graphs, especially the mathematical programming models, as most of the models are logic-based ad hoc models [30, 40]. There is
also scarcity of literature that incorporates both the interest of the attacker and the interest
of the defender in an attack graph setting. The existing studies are applicable only to the
specific graph types used as the analysis platforms. Also, to the best of our knowledge,
all of the proposed algorithms solving the attacker-defender games on attack graphs are
either heuristic or simulation based. Since most of the studies develop methods to ensure
complete security, only a few of the previous studies consider a limited budget for the defender, and none of the previous studies consider limited budgets for both the defender and
the attacker.
In this paper, we develop an attacker-defender bi-level network interdiction model and
formulate it using mixed-integer linear programming. We provide two alternative formulations for the inner problem. Our model has binary variables in both of the levels. As a
result, there is no easy way to merge the two levels into a single-level formulation; thus,
the bi-level formulation cannot be solved directly using a commonly used mixed-integer
programming solver. Moreover, although bi-level programming models are aplenty in the
network interdiction literature [10, 19], there are not many bi-level programming models
with binary variales in both levels [25]. Therefore, we develop a customized exact algorithm to solve the model. [5] provide a comprehensive discussion on the modeling and
algorithmic strategies for quantifying the resilience of infrastructure systems to disruptive
events. Our work is different from theirs in two ways: 1) their operational models are
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mainly based on different types of network flow, whereas ours is based on reachability
from a set of source nodes to a set of destination nodes, 2) their problems are functionally
opposite from ours in the sense that they try to maximize the performance whereas we try to
minimize the reachability. Our algorithm is based on the algorithmic framework proposed
by [25] and subsequently generalized by [110]. We also propose several enhancements
to the base algorithm. We show through experimentation that our algorithm is capable of
solving relatively large problems for different parameter combinations. We argue that with
further enhancements to our algorithm, along with implementation of the existing graph
simplification mechanisms [10, 63, 69, 85, 114], which reduces graph size by up to 99% in
some cases, our algorithm has potential to solve even larger problems. We also show that
both of the inner problem formulations perform well under specific parameter settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the optimization
problem studied in this paper: select a subset of arcs to minimize the maximum breach loss.
Section 3.3 provides the model formulations. Section 3.4 discusses the base algorithm, the
formulations of the master problem, and several enhancements to the base algorithm. Section 3.5 describes the plan of experiments, explains the procedure for generating the data
sets, and provides the outputs from the experiments. Section 3.6 discusses the experimental
outputs and the resulting insights. Finally, section 3.7 concludes the paper.

3.2

Problem Description
A node in an attack graph might represent several different objects including an attack

state, a security condition, a vulnerability, or an exploit. On the other hand, an arc might
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represent a change of state caused by an atomic action or attack by an attacker, exploit,
etc. If the nodes in an attack graph represent security conditions, the tail node of an arc is
a pre-condition, and the head node of that arc is a post-condition of that pre-condition. In
the attack graphs used in this paper, a node represents a security condition, and an arc represents an attacker action or an exploit. An attacker action on any one of the pre-condition
nodes of a post-condition node is enough to activate the post-condition node. This is in
contrast with some variations of attack graphs in which some of the post-conditions are
connected to pre-conditions via an AND logical gate; that is, the attacker must take action
on all or a specific subset of the pre-conditions to activate a post-condition.
Given an attack graph, an attacker tries to maximize the total reward by compromising as many high-value goal nodes as possible starting from the initially vulnerable (initial
security condition) nodes. A single path from an initially vulnerable node to a goal node
is an attack path, and one or more attack paths constitute an attack plan. The defender or
owner of the network selectively thwarts a subset of attacker actions or disables a subset
of exploits. On the other hand, if the graph is a computer network, the defender selectively blocks a subset of the communication links by deploying countermeasures such as
firewalls. These subsets of arcs constitute an interdiction plan. The defender observes the
results of different interdiction plans and attempts to minimize the maximum total reward
possible for the attacker by interdicting or protecting the best subset of the arcs. We refer
to this as the optimal interdiction plan of the defender. The defender’s and the attacker’s
problems are represented in the outer and inner levels, respectively, in the bi-level formulation of the problem, which we call the M IN M AX B REACH problem. Both the attacker and
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the defender have limited budgets. Loss associated with different nodes, cost of attacks
through different arcs, and cost of security countermeasures to interdict different arcs are
all different. We use protection and interdiction of an arc interchangeably in this paper.
Interdicting an arc is the same as protecting it from being attacked. Moreover, when a
goal node is breached, the attacker gains a reward, and the defender suffers a loss equal in
magnitude to the reward. Thus, the terms “reward” and “loss” used for a goal node also
refer to the same quantity. We also refer to an initially vulnerable node as a vulnerability
node to be concise.
Let the attack graph be denoted as G = (N, A), where N is the set of nodes, and A is
the set of arcs. N is partitioned into three subsets: NI is the set of vulnerability nodes, NR
is the set of transition nodes, and NT is the set of goal nodes. Nodes in NT can act also
as transition nodes. An attacker initiates his attacks using one or more of the nodes in NI ,
continues his attacks by visiting one or more transition nodes in NR , and then culminates his
attacks by reaching one or more goal nodes in NT , upon which he receives some reward.
We assume that after a goal node is breached once, complete damage is done, and no
further reward can be gained by attacking it again. Thus, we do not allow attacking a goal
node more than once in the model. To move from one node to another, the attacker must
attack using the arc connecting the two nodes, incurring a cost to attack. However, he
incurs this arc attack cost only once even if the arc is used on more than one attack path.
The defender may also incur a cost to employ a countermeasure on an arc to protect it from
being attacked.
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Figure 3.1 shows an example attack graph. Information inside the nodes includes the
labels of the nodes and the losses due to breach separated by a hyphen (e.g., the label “6-5”
denotes node 6, which has a loss of 5 if breached). Salmon nodes with dashed outlines
are the vulnerability nodes, light blue nodes are the transition nodes, and green nodes are
the goal nodes. To make the example simple, assume that the cost of countermeasures and
attacks is 1 for all of the arcs in this graph. Also, assume that the budgets of the attacker
and the defender are 3 and 0, respectively. So, the attacker attacks without any interdiction
by the defender. In this case, an optimal attack plan for the attacker is to attack goal nodes
5 and 7 using the attack paths {(0,3),(3,5)} and {(0,3),(3,7)}, resulting in a total reward
of 35. Now, assume that the defender’s budget is 1, and the defender interdicts arc (3,5).
In this case, an optimal attack plan is to attack goal nodes 4 and 5 using the attack paths
{(0,2),(2,4)} and {(0,2),(2,5)}, resulting in a total reward of 25. By interdicting arc (3,5),
the defender minimizes the maximum total reward achievable by the attacker. Note that
in the first attack plan, the attacker uses arc (0,3) to breach two goal nodes. However, the
attacker incurs the arc attack cost only once to attack the goal nodes using this arc. The
same applies for arc (0,2) for the second attack plan.

3.3

Mathematical Formulations
In this section, we formulate the M IN M AX B REACH problem as a bi-level mathematical

programming model. The outer level represents the defender, and the inner level represents
the attacker. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 list the notation used in the rest of this paper.
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Figure 3.1
Example attack graph

Table 3.1
Parameters
Parameters
L(i)
E(i)
ctb
cdij
caij
Bd
Ba
M
cbp
Ap
Pk

Description
Set of arcs leaving node i
Set of arcs entering node i
Loss due to breach of a goal node t ∈ NT
Cost of deployment of countermeasures on arc (i, j) ∈ A
Cost of using arc (i, j) ∈ A in one or more attack paths
Defender’s budget
Attacker’s budget
Large number enforcing the upper bound on variables
Loss due to breach of a goal node through path p
Set of arcs in path p
Set of paths in attack (iteration) k
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Table 3.2
Variables
Variables
zt
xi j
yi j
yti j
wi j
up

Description
(
1 if goal node t is breached
0 otherwise
(
1 if countermeasures are deployed on arc (i, j)
0 otherwise
Number
of attacks through arc (i, j)
(
1 if goal node t is attacked using arc (i, j)
0 otherwise
(
1 if arc (i, j) is used for one or more attacks
0 otherwise
(
1 if path p is removed
0 otherwise

The objective of the outer problem is to minimize the maximum reward achievable by
the attacker. The outer problem M IN M AX B REACH is formulated as follows.

min f (X)

∑

(3.1)
cdij xi j ≤ Bd

(3.2)

(i, j)∈A

xi j ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ A.

(3.3)

The function f (X) in (3.1) computes the maximum total reward achievable by the attacker for a given countermeasure vector X. Constraint (3.2) ensures that the total countermeasure cost does not exceed the budget.
The objective of the inner problem is to maximize the total reward possible by breaching the goal nodes given the values in the countermeasure vector X from the outer problem.
78

We refer to the following formulation of the inner problem as M AX B REACH BM. The BM
at the end of MaxBreachBM indicates the presence of big M in this formulation.

f (X) = max

∑ ctbzt

(3.4)

t∈NT

zt −

yit = 0

∑

∀t ∈ NT

(3.5)

(i,t)∈E(t)

yi j −

∑
(i, j)∈L(i)

zt ≤ 1

y ji = 0

∀t ∈ NT

yi j ≤ Mwi j
wi j ≤ 1 − xi j

∑

∑

∀i ∈ NR

(3.6)

( j,i)∈E(i)

∀(i, j) ∈ A
∀(i, j) ∈ A

caij wi j ≤ Ba

(3.7)
(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)

(i, j)∈A

yi j ≥ 0

∀(i, j) ∈ A

wi j ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ A

(3.11)
(3.12)

The objective function (3.4) calculates the total reward acquired by the attacker. Constraint (3.5) enforces that if at least one of the arcs going into a goal node is attacked, then
the goal node is attacked. Constraint (3.6) ensures that an attack does not stop after visiting
a transition node. Constraint (3.7) ensures that a goal node is not attacked more than once.
Constraint (3.8) makes sure that if an arc is not used, no attack can be carried out through
that arc. Intuitively, the attacker does not need to carry out more attacks through an arc than
there are goal nodes; therefore, we set M = |NT |. Constraint (3.9) ensures that an arc is not
used by the attacker if the arc is interdicted by the defender. Constraint (3.10) ensures that
the attacker does not spend more than the budget. Constraints (3.8) and (3.12) together en79

sure that even if more than one attack is carried out through arc (i, j), the attacker incurs the
cost of attacking through (i, j) only once. Notice that the M AX B REACH BM formulation
resembles a network design problem, especially because of constraint (3.8) accompanied
by constraints (3.5) and (3.6). Constraints (3.5) and (3.6) are equivalent to the flow balance
constraints of a network design problem.
Notice that constraint (3.5) in its current form does not allow intermediate goal nodes.
Constraint (3.5) is reformulated as follows to allow intermediate goal nodes.

zt =

∑
(i,t)∈E(t)

yit −

∑

yti

∀t ∈ NT

(3.13)

(t,i)∈L(t)

Initial computational experiments using our algorithm (see section 3.4) on small problems showed that the majority of computation time spent solving the problem is spent
solving the inner problem. Initial investigation into the inner problem solutions also shows
that its LP relaxations are not tight because of the big M in constraint (3.8) despite using |NT | as the value of M. Therefore, in an effort to remove the big M, we reformulate the inner problem, which we refer to as M AX B REACH D (the D at the end of
M AX B REACH D indicates that this is a disaggregated version of the M AX B REACH BM formulation). In fact, M AX B REACH D resembles a multi-commodity network design problem
where goal nodes are analogous to the commodities. To be concise, we commonly refer to
the M AX B REACH BM and the M AX B REACH D formulations as the M AX B REACH formulation whenever that is appropriate. The solution of M AX B REACH produces an attack plan,
Ā, for the attacker, that is, wi j = 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ Ā. M AX B REACH D is formulated as follows.
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f (X) = max

∑ ctbzt

(3.14)

t∈NT

zt −

ytit = 0

∑

∀t ∈ NT

(3.15)

(i,t)∈E(t)

yti j −

∑
(i, j)∈L(i)

ytji = 0

∀i ∈ NT , ∀t ∈ NT \t

(3.16)

ytji = 0

∀i ∈ N\(NI ∪NT ),

(3.17)

( j,i)∈E(i)

yti j −

∑

∑

(i, j)∈L(i)

∑
( j,i)∈E(i)

∀t ∈ NT
zt ≤ 1

∀t ∈ NT

yti j ≤ wi j

∀(i, j) ∈ A, ∀t ∈ NT

wi j ≤ 1 − xi j

∑

∀(i, j) ∈ A

caij wi j ≤ Ba

(3.18)
(3.19)
(3.20)
(3.21)

(i, j)∈A

yti j ≥ 0

∀(i, j) ∈ A, ∀t ∈ NT

wi j ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ A

(3.22)
(3.23)

The objective function (3.14) of M AX B REACH D is the same as the objective function (3.4) of M AX B REACH BM. Also, constraints (3.18), (3.20), (3.21), and (3.23) in
M AX B REACH D are directly equivalent to constraints (3.7), (3.9), (3.10), and (3.12), respectively, in M AX B REACH BM. Constraint (3.15) enforces that if attack is sent for goal
node t using at least one of the arcs going into the goal node, then the goal node is attacked. Constraint (3.16) ensures that any attack sent for a goal node t does not stop at any
other goal node. Constraint (3.17) requires that an attack does not terminate at a transition node. Constraint (3.19) has the same meaning as constraint (3.8) except that now it is
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enforced for attacks sent for each of the goal nodes. Because one attack, at most, can be
sent for a goal node, constraint (3.19) does not require a big M, unlike constraint (3.8) in
M AX B REACH BM.
However, M AX B REACH D eliminates the big M at the expense of adding a large number of variables and constraints because the number of yti j variables is much higher than
the number of yi j variables in M AX B REACH BM. The index t in yti j means that attacks
through an arc are now disaggregated into attacks aimed at each of the goal nodes. Also,
M AX B REACH D has constraints for all t in constraints (3.16) and (3.17). Refer to sections 3.5 and 3.6 for a comparative analysis of the performances of M AX B REACH BM and
M AX B REACH D formulations.

3.4

Solution Approach
Bi-level mixed-integer programs with binary variables only in the outer level can be

converted to a single level by taking the dual of the inner level and merging the inner level
with the outer level [157, 66]. Because our bi-level formulation has binary variables in
both levels, the inner problem has a nonzero duality gap, requiring it to take a different
approach. Thus, we develop a customized algorithm to solve our model. The framework
of our algorithm is motivated by the algorithm in [25]. The algorithm requires two models
to generate the upper and lower bounds. We refer to the model generating the upper bound
as the sub-problem and the model generating the lower bound as the master-problem. The
algorithm alternates between the master-problem and the sub-problem in an effort to reduce the optimality gap (i.e., the gap between the two bounds) at every iteration. The
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master-problem finds an optimal interdiction plan for a given set of alternative attack plans
generated by the sub-problem so far, whereas the sub-problem finds an optimal attack plan
for a given interdiction plan generated by the master-problem.
The solution of the sub-problem (M AX B REACH ) for a feasible interdiction plan produces an upper bound. However, there is no easy way to generate a good lower bound.
Thus, to generate the lower bound, we adapt a model (M I NAT R ISK ) from a study by
[104] on interdicting networks to prevent the spread of infections.

3.4.1

Theorem 1 (NP-hard)

The attacker problem (M AX B REACH) is NP-hard.
Proof: If there are only two levels in an attack graph, the initially vulnerable nodes in the
upper level and the goal nodes in the lower level, the attack graph simplifies into a directed
bipartite graph as shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2
Bipartite attack graph.

The attacker problem on a bipartite graph is a binary knapsack problem. Let, st be a
binary variable representing the breach of a goal node t in an attack plan. If st = 1, goal
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node t is breached, and it costs the attacker an amount, ctm = min(cait ). Then, the binary
knapsack attacker problem can be formulated as follows: max ∑t∈NT ctb st : ∑t∈NT ctm st ≤
Ba , st ∈ {0, 1} ∀t ∈ NT . We know that the binary knapsack problem is NP-hard. Therefore,
the attacker problem on a general attack graph is NP-hard.

3.4.2

Lemma 1

An attack is a tree in the attack graph.
Proof: In a residual graph after interdiciton, every node can be breached through zero
or more minimum cost paths. The attacker incurs additional cost by breaching any node
through more than one path because of using additional arcs. However, the attacker does
not gain any additional reward. Thus, in an attacker solution, any node will always be
breached through at most one path which will result in a tree. The set of constraints (3.6)
and (3.7) in the M AX B REACH BM formulation, and the set of constraints (3.16), (3.17),
and (3.18) in the M AX B REACH D formulation ensure that any node is breached at most
once in an attacker solution.

3.4.3

Upper Bound

We refer to the M AX B REACH model for a specific interdiction plan X̂ as M AX B REAC H (X̂).

The optimal objective value of M AX B REACH(X̂ k ) is an upper bound for our algo-

rithm at iteration k. Then, the optimal objective value of M AX B REACH(X̂ k ) is
U(X̂ k ) = maxw,y f (X̂ k ).

84

(3.24)

3.4.4

Lower Bound

The M INAT R ISK model in [105] minimizes the number of susceptible nodes at risk of
infection from infected nodes. The idea in the M INAT R ISK model is that for a specific
interdiction plan of the defender, if the attacker is able to build a path from any of the
vulnerability nodes to a goal node, that goal node is at risk of breach. We reformulate the
M INAT R ISK model as follows in an effort to improve it before using the model for our
purpose. In our reformulation, we also incorporate the fact that the attacker has a limited
budget as opposed to no attacker budget restriction in the M INAT R ISK model. We refer to
the new formulation as M IN B REACH N ODE(Ak ) generated at iteration k of the algorithm
(presented below). Here, Ak is the set of arcs used by the attacker to carry out attack at
iteration k of the algorithm. Suppose L(Ak ) is the optimal objective value, and X̂ k is the
optimal solution of M IN B REACH(Ak ). Then, X̂ k is the new interdiction plan generated at
iteration k of the algorithm. L(Ak ) is the lower bound at the kth iteration because X̂ k is
generated considering only a subset of the alternative attack plans.
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L(Ak ) = min η

(3.25)

η≥

∑ ctbztk

∀k ∈ K

(3.26)

t∈NTk

zkj ≥ zki − xi j
zki = 1

∑

∀(i, j) ∈ Ak , ∀k ∈ K

∀i ∈ NIk , ∀k ∈ K

cdij xi j ≤ Bd

(3.27)
(3.28)
(3.29)

(i, j)∈A

zki ≥ 0

∀i ∈ N k , ∀k ∈ K

xi j ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ ∪k∈K Ak

(3.30)
(3.31)

The objective function (3.25) and the constraint (3.26) ensure that the objective of this
model is the maximum total reward acquired by the attacker from all the attacks generated
through iteration k. Constraint (3.27) ensures that if a node i is at risk of breach in attack
(iteration) k, and there exists an arc (i, j), this arc must be interdicted for node j to not
be at risk of breach through node i in this attack. All the arcs entering into node j which
have tail nodes that are at risk of breach must be interdicted for node j to be saved from
breach. According to constraint (3.28), vulnerability nodes used in attack k are already at
risk of breach in this attack. Constraint (3.2) is the defender’s budget constraint. According
to Lemma 3.4.2, an attack is a tree in the attack graph. A distinct set of nodes and arcs
represent the associated attack tree, and to differentiate an attack from any other in the
model, a new set of variables are generated for the nodes used in this attack, and a new set
of constraints (3.27) and (3.28) represent the connectivity among these nodes. Note that a
new variable zkj is generated for a node j if it is used in the attack k.
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Constraint (3.27) performs a similar function as the optimality cuts in Benders decomposition [16] in that it forces the master-problem to move closer to the optimal solution at
each iteration. However, whereas each optimality cut in Benders decomposition cuts away
a fraction of the feasible region of the master-problem, each constraint in (3.27) actually
creates a new feasible region in a higher dimension by including more and more new variables (arcs). When a sufficient number of variables and constraints has been included, the
solution of the master-problem is the optimal solution.

3.4.4.1

Theorem 1

The master problem (M IN B REACH N ODE) provides a valid lower bound.
Proof: According to Lemma 3.4.2, an attack is a tree in the attack graph. Constraints (3.26),
(3.27), and (3.28) from a specific attack in the M IN B REACH N ODE formulation above adds
the attack tree in the master problem. All the distinct attack trees are represented separately
in this formulation, thereby implicitely taking the attacker budget into consideration. The
M IN B REACH N ODE formulation adds k trees through iteration k. Because of adding only
a subset of all the possible alternative attack trees through k, the objective value of the
M IN B REACH N ODE model provides a lower bound to the defender problem.

3.4.5

Algorithm M IN M AX

Input: Parameter values for M IN M AX B REACH and tolerance ε ≥ 0.
Output: Subset of arcs X ∗ on which to deploy countermeasures with a maximum optimality gap of ε.
1. Upper bound, UB := ∞, lower bound LB := 0, current interdiction plan, X ∗ := X̂ 1 :=
0, iteration counter k := 1.
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2. Given X̂ k , solve the sub-problem M AX B REACH(X̂ k ) to determine the attacker’s optimal attack plan, Ŵ k and the associated A k .
3. If U(X̂ k ) < UB, UB := U(X̂ k ). Set X̂ K as the new best interdiction plan. X ∗ := X̂ k .
4. If UB − LB ≤ ε, go to END.
5. Generate new variables zki for the nodes used in the current attack plan. Add constraints (3.27) corresponding to the set of nodes and arcs used in this attack.
6. Solve M IN B REACH(Ak+1 ). If L(Ak+1 ) ≥ LB, LB := L(Ak+1 ) and X ∗ := X̂ k+1 . If
UB − LB ≤ ε, go to END.
7. k = k + 1, go to 2.
8. END: return X ∗ as the ε−optimal solution.

3.4.5.1

Lemma 1

The master problem produces a new solution at each iteration until convergence.
Proof: Let us assume that the master problem solution from iteration k is the same as the
master problem solution from a prior iteration q. Then, the master problem objective value
from iteration k will be at least as large as the sub-problem objective value from iteration
q. This can only be true if the sub-problem objective value from iteration q equals the
current upper bound. The upper bound and the lower bound becomes equal at this point,
and the algorithm terminates. Hence, the master problem must produce a new solution at
each iteration partially or completely interdicting all the attack plans generated so far until
convergence.

3.4.5.2

Theorem 1

The algorithm M IN M AX converges within a finite number of iterations.
Proof: According to Lemma 3.4.5.1, the master problem will keep producing a new solution at each iteration until the last iteration. If there are K possible alternative interdiction
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plans, in the worst case, the algorithm will run through K iterations adding all the possible
attack plans associated with the K interdiction plans. At this point, the algorithm must
converge because of exhausting all the possibilities. Therefore, the M IN M AX algorithm
will terminate within a finite number (K) of iterations. In reality, the algorithm usually
terminates within a small fraction of the K maximum iterations.

3.4.6

Algorithm Example

Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 demonstrate how the algorithm works using the
example attack graph in Figure 3.1. The defender’s budget is 1, and the attacker’s budget
is 3 in this demonstration. See Figure 3.1 for the original colors of the nodes and their
meanings. The dark blue solid arcs in figure 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 are either used
to attack (in the attacker’s solutions) or not interdicted by the defender (in the defender’s
solution). The dashed arcs in the defender’s solutions are interdicted by the defender. The
gray arcs in the attacker’s solutions are not used by the attacker. The input graph in each of
the sub-figures related to the attacker’s solutions is the whole graph in that sub-figure with
all the arcs in dark blue solid except the arcs interdicted by the defender in the previous
iteration. The input graphs in each of the sub-figures related to the defender’s solutions are
the whole graphs in that sub-figure with all the arcs in dark blue solid.
At iteration 3, the algorithm terminates as the lower bound (25) and the upper bound
(25) become equal. An optimal interdiction plan is to interdict arc (3,7), and a corresponding optimal attack plan is to attack using the set of arcs {(0,2),(2,5),(2,4)} comprised of the
attack paths {(0,2),(2,5)} and {(0,2),(2,4)}.
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Figure 3.3
Iteration 1: Attacker’s solution, Upper bound = 35
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Iteration 1: Defender’s solution, Lower bound = 0
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Figure 3.5
Iteration 2: Attacker’s solution, Upper bound = 35
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Iteration 2: Defender’s solution, Lower bound = 15
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Figure 3.7
Iteration 3: Attacker’s solution, Upper bound = 25
Notice from figures 3.4, 3.6, and 3.8 that the number of sub-graphs input into the
M IN B REACH model is growing at each iteration. Eventually, the M IN B REACH model
finds an optimal interdiction plan by solving for a sufficiently large number of sub-graphs
of the original graph.

3.4.7

Enhancements to the M IN M AX Algorithm

Computational experiments show that the basic M IN M AX algorithm takes too long to
terminate for graphs larger than 100 nodes. The reason is that the computation time of the
master problem increases exponentilly because of adding a large number of variables and
constraints at each iteration.

3.4.7.1

Path Based Formulation of the Master Problem (S)

We exploit the fact that an attacker solution can be repsented by a distinct set of paths
instead of a distinct set of nodes and arcs as in the MinBreachNode formulation. At each
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iteration of the algorithm, we run a search algorithm on the attacker solution to find the
set of paths used in this attack. If a path found is new, a binary variable and associated
constraints are generated and added to the master problem. If a path was used in a previous
attack, we just attach the path to the current attack. Following is the path based formulation
of the master problem, (M IN B REACH PATH(Ak )).

L(Ak ) = min η

(3.32)

η≥

∑ cbp(1 − u p)

∀k ∈ K

(3.33)

p∈Pk

up ≤

∑

p ∈ ∪k∈K Pk

xi j

(3.34)

(i, j)∈A p

up ≤ 1

∑

p ∈ ∪k∈K Pk

cdij xi j ≤ Bd

(3.35)
(3.36)

(i, j)∈A

up ≥ 0

p ∈ ∪k∈K Pk

xi j ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ ∪k∈K Ak

(3.37)
(3.38)

The right hand side of constraint (3.33) calculates the total attacker reward from all the
attacks through iteration k. Objective function (3.32) and constraint (3.33) together ensure
that the maximum attacker reward is minimized. Constraints (3.34) and (3.35) together
ensure that a path is not removed if none of the arcs on the path is not removed. Constraint
(3.36) is the defender budget constraint. Constraints (3.37) and (3.38) are the sign restriction and binary constraints, respectively. The M IN B REACH PATH formulation usually has
a significantly less number of variables and constraints than the M IN B REACH N ODE for-
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mulation. Hence, the computational efficiency of the M IN B REACH PATH formulation is
much superior to that of the MinBreachNode formulation.

3.4.7.2

Add Multiple Sub-Problem Solutions to the Master Problem (Ms)

If only one sub-problem solution is added to the master problem solution, only a
slightly different master problem is solved at each iteration requiring the algorithm to run
through many iterations to provide the master problem enough sub-problem information
for convergence. To overcome this issue along with the fact that Gurobi (commercial
solver used in this paper) is able to return multiple optimal and sub-optimal solutions from
a solution, we add multiple sub-problem solutions to the master problem at each iteration.
Adding multiple sub-problem solutions indeed reduces the number of iterations and the
average computation time. Experiments show that adding 33% of the available solutions
produces good results.

3.4.7.3

Stabilize Master Problem Solutions (TR)

One problem with the M IN B REACH formulation is that it produces very divergent solutions at initial iterations of the algorithm slowing the convergence of the algorithm. In
an effort to stabilize the master problem solution, we added trust region cut at the initial
iterations (20) of the algorithm. Suppose x̂i j is the master problem solution from iteration
k and X̂ k = {(i, j) : x̂i j = 1}. Then, we add the following trust region cut to the master
problem at the next iteration.
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∑
(i, j)∈
/ X̂ k

xi j +

(1 − xi j ) ≤ 0.33 ∗ 2 ∗ |X̂ k |

∑

(3.39)

(i, j)∈X̂ k

The left hand side of constraint (3.39) calculates the Hamming distance [56] between
the interdiction plan from iteration k and the interdiction plan from iteration k + 1. The
right hand side of constraint (3.39) ensure that a maximum of one-third of all the arcs
interdicted at the current iteration is replaced at the next iteration. Master problem with the
trust region cut does not provide a valid lower bound. Thus, we update the lower bound
only after we stop adding the trust region cut. Experiments show that although the impact
of adding trust region cut is not significant, the average computation time is slightly lower
with the trust region cut in the master problem.

3.4.7.4

Apply Heuristic to Solve the Master Problem (Hf)

We greedily select a set of arcs to be removed using the following steps at each iteration.
1. Initialize, Xh = 0,
/ tBudget = 0.
Saved

ij
for each of the arcs not selected yet and
2. Evaluate a metric, Scorei j = SecurityCost
ij
the removal of the arc does not exceed the budget. Here, Saved is the difference
between current maximum total reward gained by the attacker and the maximum
reward gained if the arc is removed. And, SecurityCost is the arc security cost.

3. Select the arc (i, j) with the maximum Score calculated in step 2 and add to Xh.
tBudget = tBudget + SecurityCosti j .
4. If tBudget < Bd, go to step 2, else return Xh.

The solution Xh generated by the above heuristic can be used on its own as the master
problem solution. Xh can also be used as a warm start to the master problem at each
iteration. We apply the later approach along with limiting the number of nodes explored
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in the master problem solution to 1 as our heuristic method. We refer to this heuristic as
the heuristic method with master heuristic. Exploration of the master problem solution
can be limited to 1 node without applying the master problem heuristic. We refer to the
latter method as the heuristic method without master heuristic. Neither of the heuristic
methods is expected to produce a valid lower bound. Nevertheless, we use the master
problem solution from the heuristic methods as the lower bound for the convergence of the
algorithm keeping in mind that the final solution might not be optimal.

3.5

Computational Experiments
In this section, we perform experiments to ascertain the effects of the model parameters

and different topological attributes of attack graphs on the computation times and the loss
due to breach. All the experiments are performed on synthetic attack graphs generated
using the approach described in the following paragraph. All the experiments are carried
out on a laptop with an Intel core i7 2.70 GHz processor and 16 GB RAM. Gurobi [53] is
used to solve both the M AX B REACH and the M IN B REACH problems.
In most of the attack graphs in the literature, nodes are organized in a hierarchical
structure with nodes in one level having directed arcs incident to nodes in the subsequent
level [85]. A level usually means the level of access acquired into the system. Thus, if
an attack path has five levels, an attacker will have to acquire five successive levels of
access, possibly by using five different exploits, in order to reach a goal node. This is
very similar to attack trees except that any node might have more than one incoming arc,
making it a graph. Keeping that in mind, we generate the graphs for this paper randomly
96

using the following approach. The whole set of nodes are arbitrarily divided into r levels.
All the nodes in the first level are designated as vulnerability nodes, and all the nodes in
the last level are designated as the goal nodes. Thus, all the nodes in the intermediate
levels are transition nodes. In this way, the distance between the vulnerability nodes and
the goal nodes equals r − 1 levels. First, directed arcs are generated randomly from the first
level to the second level. Arcs are generated in a similar manner from all the levels to their
subsequent levels, and no arcs are generated in the opposite direction. Second, arcs are also
generated randomly between any pair of nodes within a level. Finally, incoming arcs are
generated randomly to each of the transition and goal nodes without any incoming arc after
the first two steps. Tail nodes of the arcs generated in the final step are selected randomly
from the corresponding prior levels. The final step makes sure that all the transition and
goal nodes have at least one incoming arc. Any of the vulnerable nodes will not have any
incoming arcs. Some of the goal nodes will have outgoing arcs because of the second step.
We used values of 2, 5, 7, and 10 for the parameter r. Figure 3.9 shows a five-level graph
generated using our approach.
Table 3.3 shows the different parameters and their values used in the computational
experiments. We perform experiments on 4 different network sizes (defined by the number
of nodes) to show how the computation time is impacted by the size of the graph. The
number of arcs in each of the graphs is approximately 2.15 times the number of nodes.
Three and two different level values are used for graphs with 50 nodes and 100 nodes,
respectively to examine the variation of computation time with respect to the number of
levels. Loss due to the breach of goal nodes, the costs of attack on arcs, and the costs of
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countermeasures on arcs are generated using uniform distribution with different parameters
values.
Table 3.3
Parameters and their values in the experiments.
Parameters
Network size (nodes)
Network size and number of levels
combinations (size, levels)
Arcs
Network sizes and defender budget
combinations (size, low budget,
¡intermediate budget¿, ¡high budget¿)
Network sizes and attacker budget
combinations (size, low budget, high
budget)
Loss due to breach of the goal nodes
Cost of attacks on arcs
Cost of countermeasures on arcs

Values
50, 100, 150, 200
(50,5), (50,7), (50,10), (100,2), (100,5),
(150,5), (200,5)
≈2.15×Nodes
(50, 75), (100, 100, 150, 250), (150, 275),
(200, 375)
(50, 125), (100, 150, 300), (150, 325), (200,
425)
˜Uniform(500, 1500), ˜Uniform(1000, 2000)
˜Uniform(10, 30), ˜Uniform(30,50)
˜Uniform(10, 30), ˜Uniform(30, 50)

In table 3.4, number of levels = 5 and other parameters are at their low levels. Values
in italic mean that those graphs cannot be solved in 2 hours using exact method.
Table 3.4 reports the computation times for 4 random instances of each of the network
sizes. Experiments in this table used a single level (low) of budgets. The purpose of this
table is to show how the computation time increases with the graph size.
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Table 3.4
Growth of computation time with graph size.
Graph Params

Heuristic Method

Exact Method

Nodes

Arcs

Iters

Ttime

masTime

Iters

Ttime

masTime

50

118

22

4.8

0.4

22

6.7

0.6

50

126

21

10.1

0.4

25

12.6

1.1

50

119

21

20.6

0.3

21

19.1

0.3

50

116

21

7.3

0.4

22

7

0.5

100

237

22

62.8

0.9

23

80.1

2.8

100

235

20

73.5

0.8

20

87.6

1.8

100

230

20

50.6

0.5

23

58.4

1

100

248

25

55.2

1.3

37

114.3

27.3

150

374

167

1180.2

195.7

39

7200

7056

150

374

123

772.9

94.8

35

7200

7012

150

345

97

4557.6

51.7

29

7200

7009

150

352

109

918.5

81.3

33

7200

6953

200

431

230

2937.2

487.5

21

7200

7046

200

437

445

5190.9

1256.7

23

7200

7062

200

425

208

1661

313.5

22

7200

7023

200

424

131

992.2

181.6

24

7200

6984

In table 3.5, master model NodeLimit = 1, Gurobi initial heuristic NodeLimit (subMIPNodes) = 2000. In the columns under the heuristic method without master heuristic,
master solution was limited to single node exploration, and master problem heuristic was
not applied.
Table 3.5 reports the breach lossses from the solutions of the exact method, from the
solutions of the heuristic method with master problem heuristic, and from the heuristic
method without the master problem heuristic. The main purpose of this table is to demonstrate the high quality of the solutions from the heuristic methods.
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Table 3.5
Performance of the heuristic method.
Graph Params

Exact method

Heuristic method
with master heuristic

Heuristic method
without master heuristic

Nodes

Levels

BreachLoss

masTime

BreachLoss

masTime

%Higher

BreachLoss

masTime

%Higher

50

5

3990

0.6

4163

0.4

4.34

4436

0.3

11.18

50

5

4893

1.1

5062

0.4

3.45

5062

0.3

3.45

50

5

2999

0.3

2999

0.3

0

2999

0.3

0

50

5

3564

0.5

3564

0.4

0

3564

0.4

0

50

7

2273

0.4

2273

0.2

0

2306

0.3

1.45

50

7

1995

0.3

1995

0.2

0

1995

0.3

0

50

7

1226

0

1226

0.1

0

1226

0.1

0

50

7

2343

0.5

2343

0.3

0

2517

0.3

7.43

100

5

5122

2.8

5122

0.9

0

5122

0.7

0

100

5

5097

1.8

5191

0.8

1.84

5097

0.6

0

100

5

4749

1

4749

0.5

0

4749

0.6

0

100

5

5839

27.3

5839

1.3

0

5839

0.9

0

Table 3.6 reports the average computation times of the MaxBreachBM and the MaxBreachD
formulations fo the sub-problem. The purpose of this table is to compare the computational
performance of the two formulations under different scenarios. Columns 6 and 7 contain
average computation times (clock seconds) of the sub-problem at each iteration averaged
over a maximum of 10 iterations.
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Table 3.6
Performance of the M AX B REACH BM and M AX B REACH D formulations.
Graph Params

Defender

Attacker

Average sub-problem runtime

Budget

Budget

MaxBreachBM

MaxBreachDTime

Nodes

Arcs

Levels

50

118

5

75

150

0.31

0.26

50

126

5

75

150

0.67

0.45

50

119

5

75

150

0.71

0.27

50

116

5

75

150

0.22

0.18

50

117

7

75

150

1.31

0.25

50

116

7

75

150

0.67

0.21

50

112

7

75

150

1.18

0.95

50

109

7

75

150

0.38

0.22

50

117

10

75

150

11.7

3.63

50

124

10

75

150

4.04

2.42

50

126

10

75

150

5.5

2

50

123

10

75

150

51.4

5.5

100

237

5

250

375

5

0.65

100

235

5

250

375

12.1

1.09

100

230

5

250

375

2.65

1.14

100

248

5

250

375

4.88

1.63

100

220

2

250

375

0.15

0.38

100

225

2

250

375

0.17

0.39

100

236

2

250

375

0.22

0.38

100

224

2

250

375

0.17

0.5

150

374

5

275

325

3.6

1.56

150

374

5

275

325

5.3

1.73

150

345

5

275

325

5.25

2.63

150

352

5

275

325

6

2.5

Table 3.7 reports the computation times and the objective function values for different
combinations of the following parameters: attacker budget, defender budget, loss due to
breach of goal nodes, cost of attack on arcs, and cost of countermeasures on arcs. This
table is set up as a factorial experiment with two levels of each of the aforementioned
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parameters. The same graph with 100 nodes is used in all the resulting 32 experiments in
this table. Nodes=100, arcs=238, Binaries=476. Solved using the heuristic method.
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Table 3.7
Computation times (clock seconds) of the algorithm.
Defender parameters

Attacker parameters

WithMaxBreachBM

No.

Budget

ArcCost

GoalNodeLoss

Budget

ArcCost

BreachLoss

Iters

Time

1

100

30-50

1000-2000

150

10-30

1761

22

213.2

2

100

30-50

1000-2000

300

10-30

6790

22

45.7

3

250

30-50

1000-2000

150

10-30

1503

20

162.5

4

250

30-50

1000-2000

300

10-30

6322

20

161.2

5

100

30-50

1000-2000

150

30-50

8054

21

20.9

6

100

30-50

1000-2000

300

30-50

16978

24

74.4

7

250

30-50

1000-2000

150

30-50

6830

20

43.8

8

250

30-50

1000-2000

300

30-50

14321

22

51.4

9

100

10-30

1000-2000

150

10-30

1576

20

177.1

10

100

10-30

1000-2000

300

10-30

6379

20

76.4

11

250

10-30

1000-2000

150

10-30

1389

32

168.1

12

250

10-30

1000-2000

300

10-30

5774

31

76.1

13

100

10-30

1000-2000

150

30-50

6694

20

47

14

100

10-30

1000-2000

300

30-50

14667

26

64.1

15

250

10-30

1000-2000

150

30-50

5358

40

77

16

250

10-30

1000-2000

300

30-50

11908

78

233.2

17

100

30-50

500-1500

150

10-30

1427

20

89.1

18

100

30-50

500-1500

300

10-30

4403

23

118.6

19

250

30-50

500-1500

150

10-30

978

20

114

20

250

30-50

500-1500

300

10-30

3988

20

133.7

21

100

30-50

500-1500

150

30-50

6338

26

14.3

22

100

30-50

500-1500

300

30-50

11885

28

48.1

23

250

30-50

500-1500

150

30-50

4845

22

92.6

24

250

30-50

500-1500

300

30-50

10305

40

144.9

25

100

10-30

500-1500

150

10-30

1085

20

128

26

100

10-30

500-1500

300

10-30

3781

20

218.5

27

250

10-30

500-1500

150

10-30

541

46

223.1

28

250

10-30

500-1500

300

10-30

3394

32

146.9

29

100

10-30

500-1500

150

30-50

5336

20

108.1

30

100

10-30

500-1500

300

30-50

11998

33

101.2

31

250

10-30

500-1500

150

30-50

4802

50

102.3

32

250

10-30

500-1500

300

30-50

9679

98

260.7
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3.6

Discussion
Figure 3.10 compares the average computation times from the different computational

methods based on 4 attack graphs for each of the base or accelerated computation techniques. Nodes = 100, defender budget = 150, and attacker budget =150. In this figure, All,
N, S, SHf, SMs, and STR have the following meanings: All - path based (M IN B REACH PATH)
method with all the enhancements, N - node based (M IN B REACH N ODE) method, S - path
based method without any enhancements, SHf - path based method with master problem
heuristic, SMs - path-based method with the addition of multiple attacker solutions at an
iteration, and STR - path based method with the addition of trust region cut to the master
problem. This figure clearly demonstrates that the path based method is much superior to
the node based method. Average computation time seems to increase slightly if the master
problem heuristic is applied with the path based method.
However, table 3.5 shows that the heuristic method with the master problem heuristic
usually finds more optimal solutions and higher quality solutions (if not optimal) compared
to the heuristic method without the master problem heuristic. Thus, application of master problem heuristic can be very useful when the heuristic method is used. Addition of
multiple sub-problem solutions seems to slightly decrease the average computation time.
Addition of trust region cut also seems to slightly decrease the average computation time.
Application of all the enhancements on the path based method decreases the average computation time compared to the application of only one of the enhancements on the path
based method. Note however that the computational methods and the enhancements only
impact the computation time of the master problem.
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From the Time columns in table 3.4, we see that total computation time increases
sharply with respect to graph size, especially when the exact method is used. Graphs with
150 and 200 nodes cannot be solved in two hours using the exact method. However, the
heuristic method solves most of the 150-node and 200-node graphs in less than 15 minutes.
One important observation is that the time taken by the algorithm to solve the subproblem is much greater than the time taken to solve the master-problem during the intitial
iterations of the algorithm. However, as the number of iterations increases, the master
problem becomes bigger sharply increasing its computation time. We see from table 3.4
that when the exact method is used, the majority of the total time is spent in solving the
master problem. In contrast, when the heuristic method is used, the majority of the total
time is spent in solving the sub-problem. Comparision of the masTime columns under
the exact and the heuristic methods makes it clear that the heuristic method significantly
decreases the computation time of the master problem.
From table 3.5, we see that 9 and 8 out of the 12 solutions using the heuristic method
with the master heuristic and the heuristic method without the master heuristic, respectively
are optimal. So, a large fraction of the solutions from both of the heuristic methods are
optimal. However, the heuristic method with the master heuristic seems to find optimal
solutions more frequently and solutions with higher quality if it does not find the optimal
solution.
Comparing the computation times of the graphs with the same number of nodes and
levels, it is clear that significant variation remains. Although the number of nodes and
the levels are the same, their topologies are different because the graphs are generated
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randomly. In fact, topology plays an important role not just in computation times but also
in the total breach loss.
We see from table 3.6 that the average computation time of the MaxBreachBM formulation increases with the number of levels. Upon examination of the computation times of
the 50-node graphs, it is apparent that the computation times of the 50-node graphs with
10 levels are much higher on average than the computation times of the 50-node graphs
with 5 levels. Because of the higher number of levels, the average distance between the
vulnerability nodes and the goal nodes are much longer in the 10-level graphs than in the
5-level graphs. Thus, the 10-level graphs have more paths than the 5-level graphs, and
the paths are longer, making it relatively more difficult for the attacker to decide whether
to attack a specific node. When the graph size is significantly large relative to the number of levels, computation time of the MaxBreachBM formulation decreases significantly
with graph size. Computation times of the 100-node graphs with 2 levels are significantly
smaller than the computation times of the 50-node graphs with 10 levels. Because of the
small number of levels, there are relatively more short paths and possibly fewer total paths
from vulnerability nodes to the goal nodes in the 100-node graphs with 2 levels, making it
easier for the attacker to decide whether to attack some goal nodes. However, increasing
the number of levels while keeping the number of nodes unchanged does not monotonically increase the computation time because that makes the graph easier for the defender
to defend given the same defense budget.
Average computation time of the M AX B REACH D formulation is smaller than the average computation time of the M AX B REACH BM formulation under many network size
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and number of level combinations, especially when the number of levels is large relative
to the graph size. However, variation of computation times is also much more for the
MaxBreachD formulation. This is probably an indication that the M AX B REACH D model
is more affected by the topology of the attack graph than the M AX B REACH BM model.
Computation times of the M AX B REACH D formulation are smaller than the computation
times of the M AX B REACH BM formulation for the 100-node graphs with 2 levels in table
3.6. Recall that for the M AX B REACH D formulation, the number of constraints and variables depends on the number of goal nodes, and as the number of goal nodes increases,
the number of constraints and variables increases. Because of the smaller number of levels, the 100-node graph with 2 levels have 50 goal nodes instead of 20 goal nodes as in
the 100-node graphs with 5 levels. Therefore, we can conclude that the M AX B REACH D
formulation usually performs worse than the M AX B REACH BM formulation in cases when
the number of goal nodes is relatively high, or, in other words, the number levels is smaller
for the same graph size.
Table 3.7 shows that the heuristic method is able to solve the problem very quickly
for most of the parameter combinations. In fact, the median computation time of all the
parameter combinations is less than 2 minutes. Therefore, the heuristic method has the
potential to solve relatively large problems within a reasonable amount of time, especially
for suitable combinations of parameters and topology of the graph.
From table 3.7, by comparing the Breachloss values of the pairs of problem instances
in which the defender’s budget is low in one and high in the other (e.g., instances 1 and 17),
we see that the total breach loss for the instances with a high defender’s budget is always
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lower than the total breach loss for the ones with a low defender’s budget. Similar comparisons reveal that the total breach loss increases if the attacker’s budget increases. If the
average individual breach loss increases, total breach loss increases. If the average individual countermeasure deployment cost increases, total breach loss also increases. Finally,
if the average individual attack cost increases, total breach loss decreases.
Figure 3.11 shows the variation of breach loss with defender’s budget. This chart is
generated using five randomly generated graphs with 100 nodes. Graph0, Graph1, Graph2,
Graph3, and Graph4 have 228, 232, 228, 221, and 238 arcs, respectively. All the parameters except the defender’s budget are at their low levels. Average breach loss for a specific
budget is determined by averaging the breach losses over all the graphs.
Although there are some random variation in the plots of figure 3.11, the common
pattern of relationships between the total breach loss and the amount of the defender’s
budget is that the breach loss drops sharply for small increases in budget at the beginning,
and it then forms a concave shape until the breach loss becomes zero. This relationship
becomes even clearer from the plot of the average breach losses. This relationship between
the breach loss and the defender’s budget implies that the defender will need to spend
much more to reduce per unit of breach loss after the initial set of relatively easy security
challenges are successfully confronted. Decision makers should investigate breach losses
for a wide range of defense budgets before allocating a specific budget to ensure high return
on investment.
Finally, it might not be easy to know or estimate the budget of the attacker correctly.
Suppose the attacker’s actual budget is an unknown amount between 100 and 200, but the
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Figure 3.8
Defender’s solution, Lower bound = 25

Table 3.8
Sensitivity of total breach loss to parameter uncertainty.
Graphs

Extra Loss (%)
for 50%
Overestimate

Extra Loss (%)
for 25%
Underestimate

Graph0
Graph1
Graph2
Graph3
Graph4

11.34
27.62
33.54
13.1
21.03

10.14
4.93
3.82
1.37
14.5
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Attack graph generated using our approach

Figure 3.10
Average computation times using different techniques
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Figure 3.11
Variation of breach loss with defender’s budget
defender’s estimate of the attacker’s budget is 150. Assume also that the defender’s budget
is 250, the other parameters are at their low levels, and the five graphs are the same as
those used in figure 3.11. Values in table 3.8 are the extra breach losses due to error in
the estimates of the attacker’s budget. The second column corresponds to the extra breach
losses due to a 50% overestimate of the attacker’s budget (the actual attacker budget is
100, and the defender’s perception of the attacker’s budget is 150), and the third column
corresponds to the extra breach losses due to a 25% underestimate of the attacker’s budget
(the actual attacker budget is 200, and the defender’s perception of the attacker’s budget
is 150). For example, with respect to Graph0, the defender incurs an extra breach loss
of 11.34% due to a 50% overestimate, and an extra breach loss of 10.14% due to a 25%
underestimate of the attacker’s budget. The average extra loss is 14.17% corresponding
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to an average error of 37.5%. Therefore, the quality of an interdiction plan is relatively
insensitive on average with respect to the error in the defender’s knowledge about the
attacker’s budget. Moreover, the extra losses due to the underestimate are significantly
smaller than the extra losses due to the overestimate of the attacker’s budget. Hence, it is
preferrable to have an underestimate rather than an overestimate of the attacker’s budget to
be conservative.

3.7

Conclusion
This paper presents the breach of information resources of an organization by an at-

tacker and the defensive measures of the organization as an attacker-defender bi-level network interdiction model. The inner level represents the attacker trying to maximize the
total reward, and the outer level represents the defender trying to minimize the maximum
total reward achievable by the attacker. Both the inner- and the outer levels are formulated
as mixed-integer linear programs. We provide two alternate formulations for the inner
problem. As both of the levels have binary variables, we also develop a customized algorithm to solve the model. The path based method with the enhancements is much faster
than the node based method. Heuristic method with or without the application of master problem heuristic is capable of solving relatively large problems for various parameter
settings. The following are some of the most important findings. 1) Topology is an influential factor in computation times. 2) The computation time of the two sub-problem
formulations does not monotonically increase with random graph size. In fact, average
computation time of the MaxBreachBM formulation decreases with graph size when the
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graph size is significantly large relative to the number of levels. 3) The majority of computation time is spent solving the sub-problem when the heuristic method is used. 4) The
M AX B REACH D formulation without big M is a computationally better formulation than
the M AX B REACH BM formulation with the big M when the number of levels is relatively
high for a specific graph size. 5) Breach loss drops sharply for small increases in the defense budget at the beginning, then levels off before finally dropping sharply again with
increasing defense budget. and 6) Quality of an interdiction plan is relatively insensitive
with respect to the correctness of the attacker’s budget.
In this work, we focused on accelerating the master problem solution. Further research
should emphasize on speeding up the sub-problem solution. Decomposition techniques
such as Benders decomposition and Lagrangian relaxation aided by additional inequalities
should be investigated. This work can be extended to have actual security countermeasures
with multiple levels of defense of arcs (interdiction) rather than binary defense. It will be
valuable to relax the implicit assumptions that the attacker has complete information about
the topology of the attack graph, and that the countermeasures are capable of completely
protecting the arcs. It will also be more realistic to consider the interdiction of arcs as
stochastic; that is, the interdiction effect is probabilistic, and the probability is uncertain
within a range. Finally, it will be worthwhile to perform experiments on real attack graphs
rather than the synthetic ones used in this paper.
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CHAPTER 4
NETWORK INTERDICTION MODEL FOR CYBER SECURITY AGAINST
BOUNDED RATIONAL ATTACKER

4.1

Introduction
In multi-agent problems, including those in defender-attacker settings, it is usually as-

sumed that given the actions chosen by the defender, the attacker is able to completely
rationalize her actions and select the best action [5, 26, 57, 116]. In reality, the rationality
of the attacker might be bounded, making it impossible for the attacker to accormplish
the maximum reward attainable within a set of resource and other constraints. [140] first
presented the idea of bounded rationality. [140] argued that rationality can be bounded
in different ways such as the uncertainty in parameters, incomplete information about the
alternatives, and extreme complexity in evaluating the decisions. [92] explained that the
bounded rationality assumption results from the limitations in incorporating uncertainty
about future consequences in decision making. [70] argued that decision makers are intendedly rational but fail to materilize complete rationality occasionally due to human congnitive and emotional limitations. [34] discussed four reasons for incorporating bounded
rationality in economic models: 1) Empirical evidence is abundant that bounded rationality is important, 2) There are several impressive works showing the importance of bounded
rationality, 3) The logic behind the assumption of unbounded rationality is unconvincing,
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and 4) Reasoning to find good decisions is a costly activity. [88] is one of the first to include bounded rationality in operations research, incorporating it in the analysis of user
behavior in transportation systems.
The impact of incorporating bounded rationality in security games can be significant,
because in security games, adversaries are almost always humans. [121] presented a gametheoretic model for stackelberg security game incorporating bounded rationality. The
model developed by [121] is able to find a robust solution under many different rationality levels of the attackers. [162] developed new algorithms for finding optimal strategic
solutions using prospect theory and quantal response equilibrium. [113] showed that explicitely incorporating human behavior models representing bounded rationality can be
more effective than finding robust solutions considering only the least favorable rationality
levels.
Our work in this chapter is closely related to the work of [121] in that we also pose the
problem as an optimization model that minimizes the maximum potential loss. However,
we extend the literature on bounded rationality and the literature on network interdiction in
the following ways. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to incorporate bounded
rationlity in a stackelberg game in which the game is played on a graph. Our formulation
is a tri-level mixed integer program with the outer level representing the defender and the
inner levels representing the attacker. All the three levels are formulated as mixed integer programs making this work also the first attempt to incorporate bounded rationality
when the attacker problems are integer programs. We propose a novel exact algorithm
based on constraint and column generation to solve the model. Therefore, our exact algo115

rithm is also the fist to solve a tri-level mixed integer program with integer variables in all
levels. We demonstrate through experiments that the algorithm has the potential to solve
large problems in a reasonable timeframe. Finally, we provide valuable insights about the
characteristics of the problems in which modeling bounded rationality of the attacker is
especially important.

4.2

Mathematical Formulations
Let the attack graph be denoted as G = (N, A), where N is the set of nodes, and A is the

set of arcs. N is partitioned into three subsets: NV - the set of vulnerability nodes (initial
security conditions), NR - the set of transition nodes, and NT - the set of goal nodes. Nodes
in NT can act also as transition nodes. The attacker has a limited budget and is boundedly
rational, i.e., given a defense plan, the best solution the attacker is able to determine is
limited by a rationality factor which has a value between 0 and 1. If the value of the
rationality factor is 0, the attacker is not able to find any solution. In contrast, if the value
of the rationality factor is 1, the attacker is completely rational and able to find the optimal
solution.
This problem is an example of a stackelberg game with one leader and one follower,
and the game is played as follows. At first, the defender selects a subset of arcs to be
interdicted. The attacker initiates his attack using one or more of the nodes in NV , continues
his attacks by visiting one or more transition nodes in NR , and then culminates his attacks
by reaching one or more goal nodes in NT , upon which he receives some reward. The
attacker determines the optimal attack given the interdiction plan, attacker budget, and the
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rationality factor. The problem of the defender is to find the optimal subset of arcs which
upon interdiction minimizes the maximum reward of the bounded rational attacker. Tables
4.1 and 4.2 define all the parameters and variables used in the formulation.

Table 4.1
Parameters
Parameters
L(i)
E(i)
Ω
∆ p0
Π
lt
cbp
ε
cdij
caij
Bd
Ba

Description
Set of arcs leaving node i
Set of arcs entering node i
Set of bounded rational attacks
Set of all attacks with respect to which p0 is bounded rational, cbp0 ≤ εcbp
Set of all attacks
Loss due to breach of a goal node t ∈ NT
Loss associated with an attack p
Parameter bounding the rationality of an attacker (1 ≥ ε ≥ 0)
Cost of interdiction of arc (i, j) ∈ A
Cost of attacking through arc (i, j)
Defender’s budget
Attacker’s budget

The defender’s problem M N M X L OSS is formulated as follows.

minx

f (x, ε)

∑

(4.1)

cdij xi j ≤ Bd

(4.2)

(i, j)∈A

xi j ∈ {0, 1}
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∀(i, j) ∈ A

(4.3)

Objective function (4.1) calculates the maximum loss caused by the bounded rational
attacker. Constraint (4.2) enforces the limited budget of the defender. Constraint (4.3) is
the binary constraint.
Given an attacker budget and an interdiction plan from, the completely rational attacker’s problem M X L OSS C (x̂K ) (i.e., rationality factor equals 1) is formulated as follows.

f (x, 1) = maxx,w,z

(4.4)

∑ lt zt

t∈NT

zj ≤

wi j

∑

∀ j ∈ N\NV

(4.5)

(i, j)∈E( j)

zj ≤ 1

∀ j ∈ NT

(4.6)

wi j ≤ zi

∀(i, j) ∈ A

(4.7)

wi j ≤ 1 − xi j

∑

∀(i, j) ∈ A

caij wi j ≤ Ba

(4.8)
(4.9)

(i, j)∈A

wi j ∈ {0, 1}

∀(i, j) ∈ A

(4.10)

Objective function (4.4) calculates the maximum loss that can be caused using a specific attacker budget. Each constraint (4.5) ensures that node j is not attacked if none of
its incoming arcs is used to attack j. Each constraint (4.6) ensures that a node is attacked
at most once. Each constraint (4.7) prevents the attacker from using arc (i, j) if node i is
not attacked. Each constraint (4.8) prevents the attackers from using arc (i, j) if arc (i, j)
is interdicted by the defender. Constraint (4.9) enforces the limited budget of the attacker.
Finally, constraint (4.10) ensures binary usage of arcs.
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Then, given a rationality level of the attacker and the optimal objective value of the
complete rational attacker from M X L OSS C, the attacker problem with bounded rationality
M X L OSS B(x̂K ) is formulated as follows.

f (x, ε) = maxx,w,z

∑ lt zt

(4.11)

∑ lt zt ≤ ε f (x, 1)

(4.12)

t∈NT

t∈NT

(4.5) − −(4.10)

(4.13)

Objective function (4.11) is the same as (4.4). Constraint (4.12) is the bounded rationality constraint ensuring that the attacker is not able to find an objective value which is
greater than f (x, Ba , 1) multiplied by the rationality factor ε.

4.3

Solution Approach
The framework of the algorithm used to solve the problem in this work is the same

as the framework of the M IN M AX algorithm in [108]. In this framework, a sub-problem
which is the the attacker problem provides the upper bound, and a customized master
problem provides the lower bound. Solution from the sub-problem is added to the master
problem at each iteration using newly created variables and constraints. Addition of the
sub-problem solution at each iteration pushes the master problem to implicitly enumerate
all the alternative attacks and find the overall optimal solution.
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4.3.1

Upper Bound

The optimal objective value of M AX L OSS R(x̂k ) at iteration k, f (x̂k , ε) is an upper
bound for our algorithm at this iteration. M AX L OSS R(x̂k , ε) is the sub-problem for our
algorithm. If UB is the minimum of f (x̂k , ε) found through iteration k,
UB ≤ f (x̂k , ε)

4.3.2

(4.14)

Lower Bound

Our model for generating the lower bound which we call the master problem is similar
to the models M IN B REACH N ODE and M IN B REACH PATH in [108]. Notice that despite
solving for the same objective functions, i.e., minimizing the maximum loss, the M IN B REACH N ODE and M IN B REACH PATH models are developed at different granularity levels. Specifically, in the M IN B REACH N ODE model, a node is the smallest unit with an
associated loss. Whereas, a path is the smallest unit with an associated loss in the M IN B REACH PATH model. The master problem of this work is developed at even a higher
granularity level. The smallest unit with an associated loss in the new master problem is an
attack which is larger than a path. In the M IN B REACH N ODE model, the goal nodes associated with an attack are combined to represent the loss associated with the attack. In the
M IN B REACH PATH model, the paths associated with an attack are combined to represent
the loss associated with the attack. In the master model of this work, the loss associated
with an attack is directely represented by treating the attacks as modeling units. We refer to the new master model as M IN M AX L OSS B(Ωk , Πk ) generated at iteration k of the
algorithm. Here, Ωk and Πk are the sets of bounded rational attacks and all attacks, respec120

tively, generated by solving the M X L OSS C and the M X L OSS B problems through iteration
k of the algorithm. M IN M AX L OSS B(Ωk , Πk ) is the master-problem for our algorithm.
Suppose, L(Ωk , Πk ) is the optimal objective value, and x̂k is the optimal solution of M IN M AX L OSS B(Ωk , Πk ). Then, x̂k is the new interdiction plan generated at iteration k of the
algorithm. L(Ωk , Πk ) is a lower bound for our algorithm at iteration k because x̂k is generated considering only a subset of the alternative attack plans. If LB is the maximum of
L(Ωk , Πk ) found through iteration k,

LB = L(Ωk , Πk )

(4.15)

M IN M AX L OSS B(Ωk , Πk ), the master problem model, is formulated as follows.

L(Ωk , Πk ) = minη,x,y,u,v η
s.t.

(4.16)
∀p0 ∈ Ωk

(4.17)

∀p0 ∈ Ωk , p ∈ ∆kp0

(4.18)

η ≥ cbp0 (1 − v p0 )
y p0 ≤ u p

∀p0 ∈ Ωk

v p0 ≤ y p0 + u p0
up ≤

∑

xi j

∀p ∈ Πk

(4.19)
(4.20)

(i, j)∈A p

∑

cdij xi j ≤ Bd

(4.21)

∀(i, j)∈A

v p0 ≤ 1 ∀p0 ∈ Ωk

(4.22)

up ≤ 1

∀p ∈ Πk

(4.23)

up ≥ 0

∀p ∈ Πk

(4.24)

xi j ∈ {0, 1}
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∀(i, j) ∈ A

(4.25)

Each constraint (4.17) calculates the loss from bounded rational attack p0 , and all constraints (4.17) together ensure that the minimized loss objective is at least as large as the
maximum of the losses through iteration k. The set of constraints (4.18) for each bounded
rational attack p0 ensures that the complete rational attacks p ∈ ∆kp0 can make p0 unattainable by the attacker if all p ∈ ∆kp0 are interdicted. Each pair of constraints (4.19) and (4.22)
ensures that a bounded rational attack p0 can be made unattainable by the attacker if either
all p ∈ ∆kp0 are interdicted, or p0 itself is interdicted. Each pair of the constraints (4.20)
and (4.23) for an attack p together ensure that at least one of the arcs on the attack must
be interdicted to interdict the attack. Constraint (4.21) is the defender budget constraint.
Constraints (4.24) and (4.25) are the sign restriction and binary constraints, respectively.
Any solution of the M IN M AX L OSS B formulation produces binary values for the u p , v p0 , y p0
variables without the binary domain restriction on these variables.
M IN M AX L OSS B(Ωk , Πk ) is the master problem formulation used to find the bounded
rational solution. The M IN M AX L OSS C formulation below is the equivalent master problem formulation used to find the complete rational solution. We use this formulation instead of the M IN B REACH PATH formulation in the experiments to compare the computational times for the bounded rational problem and the complete rational problem. MinMaxLossC formulation is used instead of MinBreachPath formulation for the comparision
because MinMaxLossC formulation is a direct special case of MinMaxLossB formulation,
thus provides a fairer comparison.
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L(Ωk , Πk ) = minη,u,x η
s.t.

(4.26)

η ≥ cbp (1 − u p )
up ≤

∑

xi j

∀p ∈ Πk
∀p ∈ Πk

(4.27)
(4.28)

(i, j)∈A p

cdij xi j ≤ Bd

(4.29)

u p ≤ 1 ∀p ∈ Πk

(4.30)

u p ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Πk

(4.31)

xi j ∈ {0, 1}

(4.32)

∑

∀(i, j)∈A

4.3.3

∀(i, j) ∈ A

Algorithm M IN BM AX

Column and constraint generation algorithm.
Input: Values of all the parameters and tolerance δ ≥ 0.
Output: Subset of arcs x∗ to interdict with a maximum optimality gap of δ .
1. Upper bound, UB := ∞, lower bound LB := 0, current interdiction plan, x∗ := x̂1 :=
0, iteration counter k := 1.
2. Given defender solution x̂k , solve the sub-problem M X L OSSC(x̂k ) to determine the
complete rational attack plan, pk and the associated objective function value f (x̂k , 1).
Compare pk with each p ∈ Πk−1 . If pk is bounded rational with respect to p, add
p into∆kpk , and add pk into Ωk . If p is bounded rational with respect to pk , add pk
into∆kp , and if p ∈
6 / Ωk−1 , add p into Ωk . Add pk into Πk .
3. Given defender solution x̂k and f (x̂k , 1), solve the sub-problem M X L OSSB(x̂k ) to
determine the bounded rational attack plan, p0k and the associated objective function
value f (x̂k , ε). Compare p0k with each p ∈ Πk−1 . If p0k is bounded rational with
respect to p, add p into∆kp0k . If p is bounded rational with respect to p0k , add p0k
into∆kp , and if p ∈
6 / Ωk−1 , add p into Ωk . Add p0k into both Ωk and Πk .
4. Calculate U(x̂k ) = f (x̂k , ε). If U(x̂k ) < UB, UB := U(x̂k ). Set x̂k as the new best
interdiction plan. x∗ := x̂k .
123

5. If UB − LB ≤ δ , go to END.
6. Create the new variables u p ∈ Πk \Πk−1 , y p0 ∈ Ωk \Ωk−1 , v p0 ∈ Ωk \Ωk−1 and constraints corresponding to the new variables.
7. Solve M IN M AX L OSSB(Ωk , Πk ). x̂k+1 is the new interdiction plan. If L(Ωk , Πk ) ≥
LB, LB := L(Ωk , Πk ) and x∗ := x̂k+1 . If UB − LB ≤ δ , go to END.
8. k = k + 1, go to 2.
9. END: return x∗ as the δ −optimal solution.

4.4

Results and Discussion
In this section, we run experiments to analyze the computational efficiency of the algo-

rithm M IN BM AX. We also develop insights about both the impact of bounded rationality
on the potential losses and the characteristics of problems on which bounded rationality has
an impact. We run experiments on both the bounded rational algorithm and the complete
rational algorithm. To find the bounded rational objective value from the complete rational
solution, we simply apply the optimal interdiction plan generated by the complete rational
algorithm on M X L OSS B and find f (x̂, ε). The experiments are performed on the same set
of 50 and 100 nodes synthetic attack graphs as those used in [108]. The experiments are
carried out on a laptop with an Intel core i7 2.70 GHz processor and 16 GB RAM. The algorithm is implemented in Python 3.4 with Gurobi [53] as the solver for all the embedded
mixed integer programs (i.e., master and subproblems).
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Table 4.3
Computation times with and without bounded rationality.
Graph size

Budgets

Bounded rational

Complete rational

Node

Arc

Bd

Ba

BObj

Iterations

Ttime

Mtime

SubCTime

BObj

Iterations

Ttime

Mtime

SubCTime

50

118

75

125

2790

31

4.7

1

1.5

2790

17

1

0

0.9

50

126

75

125

3510

42

7.3

2.4

2.3

3510

41

2.1

0.1

1.9

50

119

75

125

1976

26

3.5

0.5

1.4

2035

15

0.9

0

0.8

50

116

75

125

2481

25

3.3

0.6

1.1

2481

28

1.6

0

1.4

100

237

100

150

3651

60

39.6

4.5

5.4

3651

53

6.9

0.3

6.1

100

235

100

150

3567

84

46.8

6.6

10.9

3567

57

9.1

0.3

8.5

100

230

100

150

3318

58

28

4.4

6.9

3318

24

3.4

0

3.1

100

248

100

150

4086

97

73.3

12.4

11.4

4086

95

17.1

0.7

15.5

Table 4.3 shows both the computation times and bounded rational objective function
values of both the bounded rational solution (uses the bounded rational algorithm) and
complete rational solution (uses the complete rational algorithm). Rationality factor =
0.7. According to table 4.3, the maximum time taken by the bounded rational solution
is 73.3 seconds for a problem with 100 nodes. This table also shows that the bounded
rational solution takes significantly longer total time than the complete rational solution.
The values in the SubCTime columns under the bounded rational solution and complete
rational solutions are comparable, meaning that the time to solve the complete rational sub
problems using the two algorithms are not very different. In contrast, the master problem
computation time (Mtime) for the bounded rational solution is much greater than the master problem computation time for the complete rational solution. Moreover, the bouned
rational solution has one addtional time component which is the time to solve the bounded
rational sub problem (SubBTime). Table 4.3 shows that the time to solve the bounded ra125

tional sub problem is significantly longer than the time to solve the complete rational sub
problem
Although the 50 and 100 nodes problems are solved reasonably quickly, there is an
order of magnitude growth in the computation time from the 50 node problems to 100 node
problems, meaning that the algorithm, without any speedup mechanism, might not be able
to solve significantly larger problems in a reasonable timeframe. One aspect of the bounded
rational algorithm which might be inflating the computation time is the significantly larger
number of iterations compared to the M IN M AX algorithm in [108]. Experiments show
that the lower bound remains 0 for most of the iterations of the algorithm except only
in the last few iterations. One idea to improve the lower bound will be to constrain the
sub problems to not generate solutions that are highly overlapping in the set of arcs used.
Improving the lower bound will most probably decrease the number of iterations needed
for the convergence of the algorithm which in turn will reduce the total computation time.


Figure 4.1
Example 1
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Table 4.2
Variables
Variables
zi
xi j
wi j
up
v p0
y p0
η
x, w, y, u, v, z

Description
(
1 Node i is breached
0 otherwise
(
1 if arc (i, j) is interdicted
0 otherwise
(
1 if arc (i, j) is used for one or more attacks
0 otherwise
(
1 if attack p is interdicted
0 otherwise
(
1 if bounded rational attack p0 is interdicted
0 otherwise
(
1 if all attacks p ∈ ∆ p0 is interdicted
0 otherwise
Maximum potential loss in the residual graph
Vector representations of the variables xi j , wi j , y p0 ,
u p , v p0 , zi , respectively



Figure 4.2
Example 2
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Figure 4.3
Example 3



Figure 4.4
Example 4



Figure 4.5
Example 5
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Figure 4.6
Example 6
One important observation from table 4.3 is that, in seven out of eight experiments,
the complete rational solution and bounded rational solution produced the same bounded
rational objective function value (BObj). In this work, we are investigating the change in
defender’s interdiction plan and the consequent change in the loss suffered by the defender
due to bounded rationality, and the prior observation suggests that bounded rationality
rarely has an impact. However, a deeper look into the reasons for the equal bounded
rational objective values from the complete rational and bounded rational solutions reveals
that it is indeed quite easy to come up with many examples with a high impact of bounded
rationality. We created the six eample graphs in figures (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), and
(4.6) to demonstrate the characteristics of problems in which bounded rationality has an
impact. To simplify the discussion, we assume that both the budgets of the defender and
the attacker are equal to 1, which makes each of the problem having 7 non-overlapping
attacks. The bounded rationality factor value is 0.7.
The examples in figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 are again used to characterize
the problems having impact of bounded rationality. Csol and Bsol in the SolType column
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Table 4.4
Examples with and without the impact of bounded rationality.
Examples

SolType

Attack 1

Attack 2

Attack 3

Attack 4

Attack 5

Attack 6

Attack 7

Csol

30

20

13

8

5

3

2

Bsol

30

20

13

8

5

3

2

Csol

30

24

19

15

12

10

8

Bsol

30

24

19

15

12

10

8

Csol

30

29

28

17

5

5

2

Bsol

30

29

28

17

5

5

2

Csol

30

29

28

17

10

10

5

Bsol

30

29

28

17

10

10

5

Csol

30

29

28

17

15

10

5

Bsol

30

29

28

17

15

10

5

Csol

30

29

28

27

26

25

17

Bsol

30

29

28

27

26

25

17

1

2

3

4

5

6

mean complete rational solution and bounded rational solution, respectively. In a specific
solution (row), the cell highlighted in blue indicates the interdicted attack, and the cell in
yellow indicates the optimal bounded rational attack. The number in a cell is the loss from
that attack. For clarity, attacks 1–7 are sorted in descending order from left to right.
According to table 4.4, for examples 1 and 2, bounded rational objective values from
the bounded rational solution and the complete rational solution are equal. On the other
hand, for the remaining four examples, bounded rational objective values are different from
those two solutions. Notice that the complete rational solution always interdicts the attack
with the largest objective function value because, if not interdicted, the complete rational attacker will always choose this attack. Notice also that in example 1, the maximum
bounded rational attacks without and with interdiction are different, and those are attack 2
without interdiction and attack 3 after interdiction. The same applies for example 2, i.e.,
attack 3 and attack 4 are the maximum bounded rational solutions, respectively without
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and with interdiction. The pattern is that both the complete rational solution and bounded
rational solution forces the maximum bounded rational attack to be the next largest attack.
However, this pattern does not hold for example 3. In this example, the interdiction of
attack 1 by the complete rational solution does not move the maximum bounded rational
attack from the original maximum bounded rational attack, which is attack 4. Attack 4
is still maximum bounded rational in this case because it is bounded rational with respect
to the uninterdicted attacks 2 and 3. So, the bounded rational objective value from the
complete rational solution is 17. In contrast, the bounded rational solution interdicts attack
4, making attack 5 the new maximum bounded rational attack with an objective function
value of 5. Thus, the bounded rational solutions results in a 71% decrease in the bounded
rational objective function value. The pattern in example 3 does apply to examples 4, 5,
and 6. In summary, regardless of the number of attacks that are larger than the maximum
bounded rational attack in the uninterdicted graph, as long as the interdiction from the complete rational solution does not change the maximum bounded rational attack, the bounded
rational solution produces smaller losses than the complete rational solution.

4.5

Conclusion
In this work, we relax the assumption of complete rationality made in typical defender-

attacker game theoretic models. Specifically, we incorporate the idea of bounded rationality of the attacker in a stackelberg defender-attacker zero-sum game and formulate the
problem as a tri-level mixed-integer program with integer variables in all levels. The first
level represents the defender problem which minimizes the maximum loss casued by the
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bounded rational attacker. The second level represents the complete rational attacker. The
third level represents the bounded rational attacker which maximizes the loss satisfying
the constraint that the bounded rational attacker is able to achieve only a fraction of the
objective value achievable by the complete rational attacker.
To solve the problem we develop a customized column and constraint generation algorithm. Although the algorithm is able to solve 50 and 100 nodes problems reasonably
quickly, the order of magnitude growth of computation time from 50 nodes to 100 nodes
problems suggests the need for considerable speed up the algorithm. Computation times
suggest that bounded rational problem is much harder to solve than the complete rational
problem. Experiments also show that, in many cases, incorporating bounded rationality
in the model does not make any difference in the loss caused by the bounded rational attacker. However, problems with specific characteristics can be impacted significantly by
the incorporation of bounded rationality in the model.
As a future work, we will conduct more experiments to thoroughly analyze the characteristics of the problems in which inclusion of bounded rationality makes a significant
difference in the solution found by our model. In addition, in this work we worked with a
single attacker with a known rationality level. We will extend this work by including multiple attackers with varying levels of rationality and budgets. We also plan to acclerate the
algorithm in different ways which include the generation and addition of non-overlapping
attacker solutions into the master problem during the initial iterations. We also plan to
parallelize the accelerated algorithm and implement it on high performance computing
platform to solve problems with tens of thousands of nodes and arcs.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

5.1

Conclusion
Cyber security is a major concern nowadays for organizations of all types and sizes.

Several high profile attacks in recent past on large corporations resulted in losses amounting to tens of millions of dollars. The cyber network of an organization can be represented
both directly as the physical network of computers and other devices and also as as a logical or virtual graph of vulnerabilities and security conditions resulting from the specific
network topology, attacker profile, and set of vulnerabilities existing in the network. In this
dissertation, we use a special type of logical graph called the attack graph which represents
all the attack paths from the initially vulnerable nodes to the goal nodes. Interdiction of
arcs on the physical network or the attack graph naturally maps into applicaiton of security
countermeasures on components of the network.
This dissertation studies several security-related problems. First, we develop network
interdiction models and algorithms to select an optimal subset of arcs to minimize spread of
infections. Our results show removing a subset of arcs from the physical network based on
two of our proposed connectivity-based metrics reduces the speed and amount of spread of
infections more than existing arc removal methods. Second, we develop robust optimization models to select subset of arcs to minimize the maximum loss from multi-stage cyber
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attacks. The optimization models capture the interaction between the defender and the attacker as stackelberg zero-sum game. Third, we developed models to consider the attacker
both as a complete rational agent and a bounded rational agent. In addition to minimizing
loss, our results provide several important insights. This dissertation extends the network
interdiction literature both by formulating the problems as novel multi-level mixed-integer
linear programs with integer variables in all levels and by developing efficient exact algorithms based on constraint and column generation and heuristics algorithms based on
monte-carlo simulation.
In chapter 2, we tackle the problem of minimizing the spread of infections in a network.
One of the ways of removing the spread of infections in a network is to remove a subset
of the arcs from the network. In this study, we study the effectiveness of different link
removal methods in minimizing the spread of infections. Specifically, we propose four
novel connectivity metrics and propose arc removal methods based on the optimization of
the four connectivity metrics. We also develop heuristic algorithms to solve our network
interdiction models. We compare the effectiveness of arc removal recommended by our
methods with the effectiveness of several other methods in minimizing spread. The other
methods are the method developed by [76], the method developed by [47], and random arc
removal. We found through experimentation that one of our methods which maximizes
the number of susceptible nodes completely isolated from infectious nodes is the most
effective in minimizing the amount of new infections. We also found that another of our
methods which maximizes the total transmission probability of the paths removed from
the netowork is the most effective in slowing down the spread of infections. Probability
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of transmission plays an important in determining the relative effectiveness of the different
methods in minimizing the amount and speed of spread.
In chapter 3, we study the problem of minimizing the losses from multi-stage cyber
attacks. In that effort, attack graphs are used to represent all the possible attack paths from
the initially vulnerable nodes to the valuable goal nodes in a network. An attack graph
of an organization is generated using the attacker profile, topology of the network, and
the vulnerabilities existing in the network. An attacker with a specific budget can chose
from a set of alternative attack plans composed of different combinations of attack paths.
In this work, we develop a network interdiction model to find the optimal subset of arcs
that when removed minimizes the maximum loss from the alternative attacks that can be
chosen by an attacker. We formulate the model as a bi-level mixed-integer linear program
with integer variables in all levels, and the model captures the defender-attacker interaction
as a stackelberg zero-sum game. We also develop efficient exact and heuristic algorithms
to solve the model. Experiments show that the quality of an interdiction plan is relatively
insensitive with respect to the error in the defender’s knowledge of the attacker’s budget.
Experiments also show that with increase in the security budget, the breach loss drops
sharply at the beginning, then levels off before dropping sharply again.
In the defender-attacker game theoretic model developed in chapter 3, one underlying
assumption is that the attacker is completely rational meaning that she is able to find the
optimal solution. This is a typical assumtion in game-theoretic models. In reality, cyber
attackers are usually human beings, and human beings are usually not completely rational.
Thus, in chapter 4, we depart from the assumption that the attacker is completely rational.
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We consider that the rationality of the attacker is bounded meaning that the attacker is able
to inflict only a fraction of the maximum damage that can be inflicted with a given budget.
We capture the bounded rationality of the attacker using a rationality factor less than 1.
We capture the resulting defender-attacker interaction as a network interdiction model and
formulate the model as a tri-level mixed-integer linear program with integer variables in
all levels. Similar to chapter 3, our model in this work also captures the defender-attacker
interaction as a stackelberg zero-sum game with limited budgets for both the defender
and the attacker. We also develop customized algorithm based on constraint and column
generation to solve the model. Experiments show the importance of considering bounded
rationality and the characteristics of the problems with a significant impact of bounded
rationality.
We imagine a decision support software for cyber security as the ultimate outcome of
the work of this dissertation. We believe that the models and algorithms developed in this
dissertation, or some extended versions of them, can work as the vehicle for representing
the real life attack and defense scenarios, helping the software application to find the most
effective decisions for the cyber security personnel in an organization. Given the topology
of a cyber network, the profiles of the potential attackers, and the set of existing vulnerabilities, the proposed security software can work as follows. 1) An attack graph generation
module generates the attack graph. 2) Using the attack graphs and other parameters as
inputs, an optimization module finds the best subset of arcs in the graph. Our models and
algorithms work as the backbone of this module. And, finally 3) A mapping module maps
the arcs selected on the attack graph to the actual vulnerabilities, devices, or connections
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that need to be secured. A system can either be setup to automatically implement the recommendations of the software with the oversight of security personnel, or it can work as a
what if analysis tool in the manual decision making process of the security personnel.

5.2

Publications
Both of our works in chapter 2 and chapter 3 have been published as separate journal

papers in Computers and Operations Research in 2016 [106, 108]. We are currently extending the work in chapter 4 in terms of the number of attackers and the uncertain knowledge
of the defender on the rationality and budget of the attackers. We plan to submit the extended work as a journal paper to IIE Transactions by the end of 2016. In addition to the
above published or planned journal papers that are direct outcomes of this dissertation, we
also published a conference proceedings article related to this dissertation [21].

5.3

Future Research
We are currently extending the model and algorithm in chapter 4 to enable them to

represent the reality more closely. Specifically, the extended model and algorithm will
incorporate multiple attackers as well as the uncertain knowledge of the defender about the
budget and rationality levels of the attackers. We will formulate the extended model as a
tri-level stochastic mixed-integer program and adapt the algorithm developed in chapter 4
to solve the new formulation.
Parallel to the extension of chapter 4, we are also extending the work in chapter 3 with
respect to the following two aspects. First, we are incorporating multiple attackers with
different probability of realization and budget for each attacker. Second, in the resulting
137

defender-attacker stochastic problem, we minimize both the overall expected value of the
potential losses and the expected value of the largest losses. The second component of
the objective function makes the model protect against attacks with very large losses. We
formulate the network interdiction model as a bi-level mixed-integer stochastic program
with binary variables in both levels. We extend the algorithms in chapter 2 to solve the
model developed in this work. We are currently working on parallelizing the algorithm and
implement it on high performance computing to solve problems with tens of thousands of
nodes and arcs.
Further, the underlying defender-attacker games in all the models of this dissertation
are zero-sum meaning, that the gain of the attacker is equal to the loss of the defender.
However, in reality the gain of the attacker might be very different than the loss of the
defender. Thus, we plan to extend the work of this dissertation by considering the underlying game as stackelberg non-zero sum game. In addition, some variations of attack graphs
have both AND and OR nodes. Thus, in this extended work, we also plan to incorporate
both AND and OR nodes instead of only OR nodes, as considered in this dissertation.
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